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Abstract
Unlike most developed countries, the U.S. does not have a form of universal healthcare,
where the government provides insurance for all citizens, despite attempts dating back to 1915.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010 by President Obama, was
a significant expansion of government power in healthcare policy, yet did not guarantee
universal insurance. In recent years, universal healthcare proposals have gained traction as the
U.S. healthcare system faces issues of low access, high cost, and mediocre quality. In this thesis,
I intended to discover the factors that influenced the passage of past U.S. healthcare reforms and
potential paths forward.
I applied Kingdon’s multiple streams approach, which addresses the factors in the
policymaking process that influences a bill’s passage, to the ACA and the Health Security Act,
which was a universal healthcare proposal by President Clinton. The ACA was able to achieve
passage because of its incremental approach and Obama’s presidential strategy, which included
delegating the creation of the legislation to Congress, negotiating with organized forces, and
maximizing his political capital. Kingdon’s multiple streams approach highlights the difficulty
Medicare for All advocates will have in gaining passage, especially due to insufficient support
among the policy community and political actors. In the short-term, advocates should pursue
other policies, such as a public option or Continuous Autoenrollment with Retroactive
Enforcement (CARE), that can contain costs and expand coverage.
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Introduction
Debates regarding universal healthcare in the U.S., a policy that would guarantee health
insurance for all individuals, have occurred since the early twentieth century. The American
Association of Labor Legislation (AALL) sponsored a bill in 1915 that would not establish
universal healthcare, but would provide insurance for working class families and those with
salaries less than $1200 a year and would be the first national compulsory health plan in the U.S.
The bill was modeled off of similar programs that had been implemented in European countries
since 1883. The proposal, however, faced strong opposition from the American Federation of
Labor, state medical societies, and the private insurance industry. The American Federation of
Labor opposed compulsory health insurance and believed public insurance programs would
weaken unions by undermining their ability to provide benefits to members, while state medical
societies opposed the bill because of disagreements over payments to physicians. Private
insurance in the early twentieth century existed to provide benefits upon death, such as by
covering funeral expenses. Since the bill provided death benefits, the private insurance industry
opposed the bill as it would have negatively impacted their multi-million-dollar industry. Their
opposition convinced the American Medical Association, which had formed a committee to
work with the AALL on a compulsory health insurance program, to oppose the bill and even
deny they had ever supported it. Once the U.S. entered World War I, it was attacked as “German
socialist insurance.” Universal healthcare was not seriously debated again until the 1930s due to
the widespread opposition from significant stakeholders and interest groups (Physicians for a
National Health Program).
Universal healthcare has entered, left, and reentered the health policy debate every few
decades since its first defeat. Currently, the U.S. healthcare system is fragmented and divided
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with both public and private forms of insurance. In 2018, 67.3% of Americans received coverage
through a private insurer, with 55.1% of all Americans receiving coverage through their
employer. Roughly a third of all Americans, 34.4%, receive coverage through a public plan, such
as Medicare or Medicaid. This, however, leaves 8.5% of the population uninsured as they do not
have enough money to purchase insurance but they make too much money to qualify for
government health programs (Berchick, Barnett, and Upton 2019). Medicare and Medicaid are
the two largest public insurance programs in the U.S. as they provide insurance to Americans
older than 65 and low-income individuals, respectively. The two programs were passed in 1965
by President Johnson as part of his War on Poverty program, which highlights the relationship
between economic status and health insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation).
While universal healthcare continued to be debated following the passage of Medicare
and Medicaid, significant healthcare reform would not be achieved until the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted during President Obama’s first term in 2010. The
ACA was intended to create “shared responsibility” between the government, employers, and
individuals to provide access to health insurance (The Commonwealth Fund). The ACA
attempted to achieve this through several policies that aimed to expand access, increase
consumer protections, and contain costs (King 2011). The ACA expanded access to insurance
through both private insurance and public programs. Since a majority of Americans receive
insurance through their employer, the ACA required businesses with over fifty individuals to
provide insurance and offered tax incentives to small businesses who provided insurance. The
ACA not only mandated businesses to provide insurance but required individuals to purchase
insurance or pay a fine. Individuals were also given the opportunity to purchase insurance
through the American Health Benefit Exchanges and Small Business Health Options Program
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(SHOP). These were created to help individuals and small businesses purchase health insurance
and gave states the option to either operate the exchange themselves or allow the federal
government to operate it (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). Individuals who enrolled in the
exchanges were given subsidies according to their income levels to reduce the costs of
premiums, or the monthly costs of insurance (King 2011). One of the most significant ways in
which the ACA increased access to healthcare is by expanding Medicaid. Medicaid was
expanded to cover children, pregnant women, parents, and childless adults with incomes up to
138% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The federal government would finance the entire cost
of the Medicaid expansion until 2020 when costs would slowly be shifted back to the states.
However, the mandatory Medicaid expansion was ruled unconstitutional because if states did not
expand Medicaid, they would lose all federal funds for their Medicaid program and the Supreme
Court ruled this amounted to coercion by the federal government, resulting in the expansion
becoming optional (Rosenbaum and Westmoreland 2012). As of April 2020, thirty-seven states,
including DC, have expanded Medicaid, while fourteen states have not (The Kaiser Family
Foundation 2020).
The ACA also included major provisions to protect consumers, particularly those with
pre-existing conditions, in terms of cost and access. One of the most important protections the
ACA added was prohibiting insurance companies from refusing to cover or increasing premiums
because of someone’s health status. This provision allowed individuals with pre-existing
conditions to receive the same insurance as everyone else (King 2011). Likewise, the ACA
prohibited insurance companies from placing lifetime and annual monetary caps, typically
ranging from $1 to $2 million on individuals. Insurance companies that placed a $2 million
lifetime cap would not pay for any additional medical care after they paid $2 million over an
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individual’s life. Prohibiting this has helped many Americans with pre-existing conditions, such
as premature births, afford necessary treatment (Kliff 2017). Insurance companies both inside
and outside the exchanges established by the ACA had to offer an essential benefits package,
which is a comprehensive set of services that must be covered. This helped ensure that all
individuals with insurance have access to the same set of essential medical care (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2013).
It is imperative to understand the ACA because it utilized the fragmented public-private
hybrid insurance system the U.S. has and expanded it. Current healthcare reform proposals have
again called for an overhaul of the public-private system to expand public insurance. While
Democrats have continued to debate whether incremental or more progressive approaches to
expand healthcare are the best policy option, healthcare expansion did take center stage during
the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT), who was a leading
contender for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination, introduced the Medicare for All Act
of 2019, which would enroll all Americans into a health insurance plan administered by the
government (S.1129). Another bill, introduced by Rep. Jayapal (D-WA-7) in the House, is nearly
identical to the bill introduced by Sanders in the Senate (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2019).
While there are other advocates of universal healthcare, Sen. Sanders has emerged as one of the
leaders due to the legislative lead he has taken and his role in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic
presidential primaries.
Considering that Medicare for All has emerged as a policy option, it is of vital
importance to ask the following question, “What factors influence the passage of past healthcare
reform in the U.S. and how will these factors impact the passage of future reform?” Scholars
have conducted a significant amount of research in regard to various facets of the U.S. healthcare
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system. Previous literature has detailed the problems of the U.S. healthcare system, comparisons
between the U.S. and other wealthy countries, and historical attempts to enact universal health
insurance. By analyzing others’ research on all three of the aforementioned topics and
conducting my own qualitative research, I plan on discovering the potential paths policy actors
could use to enact the preferable form of universal health insurance. I begin this paper by
reviewing the major problems associated with the issues of cost, access, and quality in U.S.
healthcare along with examining international forms of health insurance as a comparison to the
U.S. model and conducting a literature review on failed universal healthcare policies. I then
examine previous failed attempts at universal health insurance in the U.S. by utilizing Kingdon’s
multiple streams approach framework. This approach is ideal because it addresses the
policymaking process and the factors that can aid or impede the passage of a policy. I will apply
his framework to President Clinton’s failed Health Security Act and the Affordable Care Act in
order to demonstrate the applicability of the streams approach to health policy. Lastly, I will
apply this framework to the Medicare for All Act, which will highlight a potential path forward
for its passage and examine its impacts.

11

Chapter 1: Overview of U.S. Healthcare System and Literature Review
This literature review seeks to examine and define the problems in the U.S. healthcare
system. By defining these problems, I will then be able to examine why the U.S. needs to move
towards adopting a system of universal health insurance, followed by a discussion of existing
literature regarding the political and theoretical explanations for universal healthcare failure.

Issues with Cost, Access, and Quality
An extensive amount of academic and government research has focused on the most
fundamental measures of a country’s healthcare system-- cost, access, and quality. One of the
most significant barriers in America’s healthcare system is its cost. The U.S. spent $3.6 trillion in
health-related expenditures in 2018, with per capita spending exceeding $11,100; overall
spending accounted for 17.7% of America’s gross domestic product (GDP). This represented an
increase of 4.6% from 2017, as seen in the figure below (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services 2019).
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Figure 1 This figure details the growth of national health expenditures, in millions, over the past decade (OECD 2017).
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Spending on hospital care and physician and clinical services, which accounted for 53%
of all expenditures, continued to grow in 2018. The federal government and households were the
largest spenders as they were each responsible for 28% of all healthcare spending. Private
businesses accounted for an additional 20% of all expenditures, followed by state and local
governments at 17% and other private sources at 7% (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services 2019). These costs are troubling when examining the long-term trend as healthcare
expenditures increased every year from 1980, when annual expenditures were $235.7 billion, to
2014, when they were over $3 trillion (Manchikanti, Helm II, Benyamin, and Hirsch 2017). The
staggering costs of U.S. healthcare become even more apparent when compared to other
industrialized Western countries. The U.S. spent nearly two-and-a-half times more than the
average spending for the next 35 OECD countries. Further, the U.S. spent roughly 80% more
than Germany and nearly twice as much per capita as Canada, France, and Japan (OECD 2017).
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Figure 2 U.S. per capita spending in 2016 was more than double the OECD average (OECD 2017).

Further, America’s healthcare spending accounts for a considerably larger share of its
GDP than the OECD average, which is only 9% (OECD 2017). These issues of cost are
exacerbated because 5% of the population is responsible for 50% of health expenditures.
Collectively, the top 50% of Americans account for 97% of expenditures, compared to the
bottom 50% that account for 3% of spending (Sawyer and Claxton 2019). The distribution of
expenditures across the population is of importance because it highlights how the elderly and
those with chronic conditions face unique health challenges that require increased care.
Issues of exorbitant cost are directly tied to access to healthcare. In 2010, as the ACA
took effect, nearly 46.5 million Americans were uninsured, representing 17.8% of the
population. By 2016 that had declined to 26.7 million Americans, which increased to 27.9
million in 2018, or 10.9% of the population, with 45% reporting they lacked insurance because
the cost was too high (Tolbert, Orgera, Singer, and Damico 2019). While the passage of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) helped reduce the uninsured population, it has since increased.
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Figure 3 The uninsured population decreased after the ACA took effect but has increased following changes by the Trump
administration (Tolbert, Orgera, Singer and Damico 2019).
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Between 2013 and 2016, nonelderly adult Hispanics, African Americans, and Asians
experienced at least an 8% drop in the uninsured rate, while those with an income below 200%
of the FPL saw a 21% decline. While the uninsured rate has dropped among African Americans
and Hispanics, to 11% and 19% respectively, it is consistently higher than white Americans, and
rates for all three grew slightly in 2018 (Garfield, Orgera and Damico 2019; Tolbert, Orgera,
Singer, and Damico 2019). The ACA played a key role in reducing the uninsured rate, but with
over 27 million Americans still uninsured, there is significant room for improvement as nearly
45% of the uninsured are ineligible for financial assistance. The factors of race and income are
highly interconnected because most uninsured individuals were low-income and more likely to
be non-white (Garfield, Orgera, and Damico 2019). Access to healthcare in the U.S. becomes
even worse when compared to other countries.
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Figure 4 The U.S. has the third lowest insurance rate and is the only country where a majority of individuals received private
insurance yet not everyone had access to insurance (OECD 2017).

The Commonwealth Fund elaborates on the connection between cost and access as they
discovered 33% of Americans experienced cost-related problems to access. Even though most
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Americans were able to receive the healthcare they need, “a substantial portion of the
population-- about one in every ten adults (9%) said they either delayed or did not receive
medical care due to cost in 2017” (Claxton, Sawyer, and Cox 2019). These two issues, insurance
affordability and access to health care services, are “closely intertwined issues” (Manchikanti,
Helm II, Benyamin, and Hirsch 2017, 112). Considering the burden healthcare payments rests on
individuals, the leading cause of bankruptcy in the U.S. is catastrophic healthcare costs. Any
family or individual that struggles with expensive out-of-pocket payments is increasingly more
likely to accumulate debt or face bankruptcy (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). Increasing out-ofpocket costs further complicate issues of access. The average annual premium for family
coverage in 2018 was $19,616, a 20% increase from five years ago. Deductibles, the annual
amount an individual must pay out-of-pocket before insurance pays for services, doubled
between 2007 and 2018 (Claxton, Rae, Long, Damico, and Whitmore 2018).
Access to healthcare includes more than simply insurance as nearly 16 million insured
Americans were technically underinsured or lacked coverage for catastrophic medical expenses
in 2010 (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). Individuals who are underinsured have high deductibles or
out-of-pocket expenses compared to their incomes, which makes them more likely to be unable
to pay medical bills and skip care because of cost. In 2018, 29% of individuals who had
insurance were classified as underinsured, a 6% increase from 2014 (Collins, Bhupal, and Doty
2019). Access also includes unmet medical needs. According to the OECD (2017), 22.3% of
Americans purposefully missed a consultation due to the financial cost. Unmet medical needs
were particularly excessive among low-income Americans, with 43% reported experiencing an
unmet medical need (OECD 2017). This subgroup maintains increasingly high rates of unmet
medical needs because “inequalities in employee access to health insurance have become
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steadily worse-- and the situation for low-paid workers is scandalously bad” (Jacobs and Skocpol
2010, 20). A distinct trend between earnings and access to employer-provided insurance exists as
37.4% of workers in the bottom fifth of the wage distribution lack insurance, compared to 12.4%
of workers in the middle fifth. While both represent high uninsured rates, and are noticeably
higher from rates in the 1980s, low-income Americans are at a significant disadvantage (Jacobs
and Skocpol 2010). Before the ACA took effect, nearly half of poor Americans were ineligible
for coverage under Medicaid and a total of 30% of the poor or near poor under 65 lacked any
form of insurance (Rice et al. 2018). One of the most significant provisions of the ACA was the
Medicaid expansion, which extended eligibility to individuals within 138% of the FPL.
However, not all states have expanded Medicaid, with fourteen states opting not to, excluding
4.4 million Americans from the Medicaid program (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2020).
Achieving access is one of the most fundamental aspects of any country’s healthcare system as it
“provides a critical entry into the healthcare system through access to primary care, preventive
services, and referrals to specialists” (Rice et al. 2013, 326). For those who lack insurance, it
becomes increasingly challenging to enter the healthcare system as 42% of uninsured Americans
were unable to obtain preventive care. The Commonwealth Fund ranked the U.S. eleventh out of
the eleven healthcare systems they evaluated because of extremely inadequate access (Schneider
et al 2017).
In regard to healthcare quality and outcomes, the U.S. did perform noticeably better.
Schneider at al. (2017) ranked the U.S. as fifth out of the eleven healthcare systems examined.
America performed well in domains including the doctor-patient relationship, chronic disease
management, and shared decision-making with primary care and specialist providers. The U.S.
also had lower cancer mortality rates than any other comparable countries. However, the U.S. did
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not perform as well in areas involving life expectancy and infant mortality rates, two of the most
important indicators of the quality of a country’s healthcare system, despite outspending other
countries. Outcomes in both measures for the U.S. were lower than the OECD average. One of
the most significant measures in which the U.S. underperformed was hospital admissions for
preventable diseases (Schneider et al. 2017). The U.S. had higher rates of hospital admissions for
congestive heart failure, asthma, and diabetes. This is notable as higher rates of hospital
admission are a sign that “prevention services are either not being adhered to or delivered”
(Sawyer and McDermott 2019). This is connected to the issues of cost and access as uninsured
individuals are “more likely to skip preventative services and report that they do not have a
regular source of care” (Garfield, Orgera, and Damico 2019). Nearly 16% of adults utilized the
ER for non-emergent care for conditions a physician could have treated. American adults do this
roughly twice as much as other countries. The U.S. additionally has a higher amenable mortality
rate, which is the measure of preventable deaths if individuals received timely and effective care.
The barriers of cost and access are affecting the quality of care individuals receive as 50% of
uninsured individuals lack a regular source of care, which means when they do need care, they
are forced into utilizing inpatient facilities like a hospital (Schneider et al. 2017). Thus, access to
care matters not just for financial or equality reasons, but, more importantly, for health reasons.
Patients in the U.S. were also more likely to experience a medical, medication, or
laboratory error compared to other countries (Sawyer and McDermott 2019). These negative
outcomes further worsen the economic costs of the U.S. healthcare system. Frenk and Ferranti
(2012) note this results in “diminished productivity, higher costs in the future, and disrupted
families and communities” (863). U.S. healthcare quality has continued improving, but not at a
fast-enough rate. Even Americans who can even afford health insurance are continuing to pay
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more for worse healthcare, meaning “we cannot justify our broken-down patchwork system by
saying it delivers better health results” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010, 23).

Universal Health Insurance Around the World
While every healthcare system has its own policy issues, the U.S. suffers from more
severe and deeply embedded issues than other countries. The U.S. performs extremely poorly
across all measures compared to countries that provide universal healthcare. Beland, Rocco, and
Waddan (2016) argue there is widespread agreement that the U.S. healthcare system needs
reform, but disagreements exist on how to best accomplish it. I argue universal healthcare is the
best approach because it “provides financial protection against the cost of illness and promotes
access to care for the whole population” (OECD 2017, 18). As a result of America’s reliance on
a hybrid private-public healthcare system, millions lack access to insurance, which is striking
when “all other industrial nations provide their entire populations with health coverage.” (Jacobs
and Skocpol 2010, 22) Universal coverage would not only expand access but can decrease the
augmenting healthcare costs the United States has experienced since the 1980s. Over the past
few decades, countries that have implemented universal health coverage experience lower
overall healthcare costs. These cost savings, according to Frenk and Ferranti (2012), result in
greater financial security for families, which in turn reduces the chances of an individual’s
economic ruin.
Current literature recognizes the variety of universal healthcare systems that exist
throughout the world but has been able to classify these systems into one of three types. Health
Systems in Transition, an analysis of healthcare systems conducted by The European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, has contributed an extensive amount of knowledge
to health policy literature. The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies is a
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collaborative approach undertaken by the World Health Organization, national and regional
European governments, health system organizations, and academia to “support and promote
evidence-based policy-making through the comprehensive and rigorous analysis of European
health systems, the production of timely and reliable evidence in response to real policy needs,
and the communication of evidence in ways that are useful to and usable by policymakers”
(European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies). Their research has not only focused on
the overall structure of over fifty countries' healthcare system but a country’s resources, services,
recent reforms, and assessment. Considering the significant amount of information they have
gathered, it serves as an ideal frame of reference for when discussing types of universal
healthcare and features.
Socialized Health Insurance (SHI) in Germany
The German model of healthcare originated from Otto von Bismarck upon German
unification in 1883 and was gradually expanded. In Germany, all citizens are provided with
statutory health insurance (SHI), which is funded through a compulsory contribution split by
employees and employers and supplemented by some general tax revenue. Under SHI insurance,
employees and employers equally split the 14.6% of wages that must be contributed, while
unemployed individuals pay a portion of their entitlement. Although the German government
ensures all citizens receive health insurance, they do not actually administer the insurance
system. Instead, non-profit non-governmental firms called sickness funds act as the insurers.
These sickness funds contract with associations of healthcare providers, such as primary
physicians or certain hospitals. Sickness funds function in a similar capacity to health insurance
companies in America, albeit less profit-driven since they are non-profit by design and must
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provide care to all citizens. Competition is still a strong element among sickness funds as over
124 funds exist in Germany (Busse and Blumel 2014).
Nearly 85% of Germans receive coverage through the SHI system, with 11% of the
population electing to utilize Germany’s private health insurance (PHI). Germany’s PHI system
is available to citizens with an income above €56,250, or $71,564, who can elect to enroll in PHI
instead, although only 25% choose to do so (Busse and Blumel 2014; Blumel and Busse). PHI
also utilizes sickness funds, who contract with the same healthcare associations as SHI sickness
funds. People may elect PHI because payments are based on an individual’s risk at the point of
entry, making it particularly attractive for younger citizens as premiums will not increase with
age. PHI enrollees also have a greater choice in terms of premium, coverage, and deductible
options. PHI can provide higher savings to some Germans because their premium will not
increase due to their age and may serve as a cheaper alternative than losing a fixed percentage of
their income (Esmail 2014). Thus, the government plays an indirect role in the financing of
healthcare as they mandate and control the contribution rate under SHI but allow for competition
among sickness funds under both SHI and PHI.
In terms of regulation, power is shared between regional governments, the federal
government, and associations of healthcare professionals, which are mandated to join. The
shared decision-making power between the federal government and healthcare associations is
highlighted through the Federal Joint Committee (Blumel and Busse; Busse and Blumel 2014).
The Federal Joint Committee oversees the German healthcare industry and consists of the four
national healthcare professional groups—the National Associations of Statutory Health
Insurance Physicians and Dentists, the German Hospital Federation, and the Central Federal
Association of Health Insurance Funds. The Federal Joint Committee, however, is under the
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supervision of the Federal Ministry of Health. The German healthcare system is a unique
combination of public and private players as the government sets broad regulations but allows
the healthcare professionals to self-regulate under their oversight (Gemeinsamer
Bundesausschuss).
National Health Insurance (NHI) in Canada
National Health Insurance (NHI) is best exemplified through Canada’s healthcare system.
An NHI system is primarily funded publicly, with 70% of Canada’s expenditures funded through
general tax revenues. Canada’s NHI structure is heavily decentralized as provinces and territories
are primarily responsible for administering, funding, and delivering care to their citizens. The
Canadian federal government, however, does assist in financing programs through the Canada
Health Act of 1985, which requires all programs to comply with federal standards. Each province
establishes a Regional Health Authority, which oversees hospital and physician care by either
directly providing care or contracting out to other providers. Often times, RHAs serve
simultaneously as the buyer and provider of hospital and long-term care (Marchildon 2013). Due
to the considerable degree of decentralization, hospital ownership varies greatly as most of the
hospitals in one province may be publicly owned, while in another they may largely be private
nonprofit ones. If Canadian individuals want additional coverage, such as vision and dental care,
and prescription drugs, they have to purchase private insurance. However, unions, employers,
and other organizations paid for 94% of premiums for private insurance plans. Canadians do not
have to pay out-of-pocket for services from physicians or hospitals (Allin and Rudoler). In
addition to Canada, other nations that have adopted an NHI-type system are Taiwan and South
Korea (Reid 2008).
National Health System (NHS) in the U.K.
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National Health System (NHS), the last form of universal health insurance is similar to an
NHI system as they are both funded largely through general tax revenue. Similarly, the NHS
system in the U.K., established in 1948, is largely decentralized as Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Island receive block grants and can largely determine their own health policy. While it
is largely decentralized in these areas, NHS in England is different as “The United Kingdom
Treasury determines the budget for health and other social services in England”, meaning while
the other three areas can allocate funds where they see appropriate, England cannot (Cylus et al
2015, 17). There is limited out-of-pocket spending in the U.K. with medical goods, such as
prescription drugs, and long-term care accounting for 80% of out-of-pocket spending.
Individuals are able to receive free care for a number of services, such as hospitals, because
providers are paid through allocations in the English government’s budget. The government also
retains greater control of providers as most hospitals are publicly owned, with a limited amount
of publicly paid physicians (Thorlby and Arora).
This section was designed to highlight the different approaches countries have taken
towards providing universal healthcare. The German system is very different from both the NHI
and NHS system. Both rely heavily on general tax revenue, while Germany’s SHI is funded
primarily through the compulsory employer-employee contributions. Germany and England have
a similar proportion of citizens who elect to receive private health insurance, while in Canada,
over two-thirds hold private insurance. Canada has a high proportion of individuals selecting
supplemental insurance as it covers many benefits that public insurance does not, including
vision and dental care as well as prescription drugs (Allin and Rudoler). All three countries,
according to the Commonwealth Fund, have relatively similar out-of-pocket spending for its
citizens, as they range from the high $500s per capita to the mid $600s. Under the NHS system
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in England, the Secretary of State for Health oversees the delivery of healthcare services and is
responsible for contracting with healthcare providers (Cylus et al 2015). This makes NHS in
England very different from Canadian healthcare, which relies on Regional Health Authorities to
take the lead in regulation and delivery of care. Germany differs substantially from both as the
professional organizations that constitute the Federal Joint Committee self-regulate the industry
and delivery of care is primarily private. This discussion emphasizes how countries can
guarantee universal healthcare for all of their citizens yet are able to utilize public and private
institutions very differently in terms of financing, delivery, and regulation.

Health Policy Literature Review
While all of these Western democracies have adopted universal health insurance, the U.S.
has not. A significant amount of literature has worked to examine the political factors that have
impeded legislation to adopt universal healthcare. Before discussing the existing literature on the
failures of past attempts to enact universal healthcare, a brief overview of these attempts must be
discussed.
A History of Healthcare Reform in the U.S.
Following the policy discussed in the Introduction, initial attempts to enact universal
coverage date back to 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party endorsed social
insurance as a component of their platform. However, these plans failed to come to fruition, and
it was not until President Truman in post-World War II America that universal health coverage
was seriously attempted again (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2009). California and Western
Medicine provides a transcript of Truman’s speech in which he proposed the United States adopt
an NHI style system. In his address, Truman outlined the problems U.S. healthcare faced in
1945, which are similar to the ones today. Healthcare was characterized by significant urban and
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rural disparities and high costs of care that “is true for a large proportion of normally selfsupporting people” (Truman 1945, 272). The Wagner-Murray-Dingell (WMD) Bill) supported
by Truman was introduced multiple times throughout his presidency, but never gained traction.
By the 1960s, according to Berkowitz (2017), national health insurance had morphed not into
universal healthcare, but health programs for the elderly and poor.
While the passage of Medicare and Medicaid were significant steps forward for
healthcare advocates, it produced a “fill-in-the-gaps approach” which significantly faltered as
early as the late 1970s (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010, 27). Throughout the 1970s, healthcare costs
began to increase dramatically faster than both profits and wages. Universal healthcare would not
reenter policy conversations until President Nixon attempted to pass a bill in the 1970s. In an
address to Congress in 1973, he stated “Comprehensive health insurance is an idea whose time
has come. I believe that some kind of plan will be enacted in the year 1974” (Steinmo and Watts
1995, 351). Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and conservative Democratic Rep. Wilbur
Mills, who chaired the influential Ways and Means Committee, crafted a compromise NHI bill
with the Nixon administration. However, the bill could not muster enough support as “the left
protested because they thought they could get more and the right protested because they believed
they could get less” (Steinmo and Watts 1995, 353). President Ford attempted to pass his own
NHI bill, but that too failed because it could not garner support within the rest of Congress
outside of leadership (Steinmo and Watts 1995). During this time however, the federal
government utilized its bargaining power to control Medicare’s increasing costs, while
businesses and individuals faced the consequences of increased costs. Small businesses began
eliminating insurance coverage from employees’ benefits packages, while large businesses
pushed an increasing amount of premium payments onto workers. Each year “a million
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additional working-age people found themselves without health coverage-- even though public
programs like Medicaid or the State Children’s Insurance Program expanded from time to time”
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2010, 27). Creating a for-profit private healthcare system based on
voluntary employer insurance led to employers and insurance companies prioritizing profits,
with insurance companies aggressively attempting to “weed out individuals or groups of
customers who might have unusually expensive healthcare needs” (Skocpol 1997, 22). In the late
1980s, Americans began overwhelmingly supporting universal healthcare, which is unsurprising
since between 1987 and 1989 more than one in four Americans lacked insurance (Skocpol 1997).
Healthcare proposals multiplied between 1990 and 1991 amid even higher costs, further
reductions in coverage, and successful political campaigns that centered on healthcare (Steinmo
and Watts 1995). Bill Clinton emerged in 1992 as one of the frontrunners in the Democratic
presidential primary and pledged to pursue healthcare reform. Clinton’s failed healthcare reform
remains one of the most infamous of the failed attempts with an overwhelming amount of
literature focusing on its failure. The Clinton health plan was spearheaded by the Task Force on
National Health Care Reform, a significant departure from past attempts as it was previously a
combination of presidential and congressional leadership, rather than sole executive efforts, that
produced a bill. The Task Force on National Health Care Reform attempted to fulfill the pledge
Clinton ran on, which promised a plan that was “competition within a budget” and aimed to
produce a bill that created affordable coverage yet contained cost reductions (Skocpol 1995 69).
When the plan was released at the end of 1993, support for the 1,342-page bill began to collapse,
and soon it was “difficult to find out-and-out supporters” (Clymer, Pear, and Toner 1994).
Clinton’s efforts to reform the system collapsed and has been described as “spectacular and
politically costly to its sponsor” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010 69).
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After the failure of the Clinton health plan, it was “not at all certain that the next
Democratic president would attempt to introduce significant change in this issue area and,
perhaps, bring about universal coverage” (Beland, Rocco, and Waddan 2016, 435-436).
Throughout the 2008 election, in both the primary and the general election, Obama remained
very cautious and ambiguous about healthcare reform (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). The ACA
largely reaffirmed America’s hybrid public-private insurance system as most Americans would
continue to receive coverage through employment and the private insurance market.
Explanations for the Failure of Universal Healthcare
Arguments explaining why universal health coverage has failed in the past utilizes one of
three approaches: an institutional argument, an incrementalism argument, or flaws in presidential
strategy.
Institutional Theory
The idea of the institutions themselves preventing healthcare reform is explored by
Steinmo and Watts (1995) who argue political culture and the role of interest groups are not the
primary reason why healthcare reform has failed. They argue the ability of interest groups to
defeat universal coverage stems from the institutions which have enabled economically powerful
interest groups to utilize the fragmented structure of American government to sway elected
officials. Steinmo and Watts (1995) further argue it is the structure of Congress that prevents a
controversial issue, such as universal healthcare, from being enacted. The use of “committee
government,” in which congressional committees have the most power in determining the
legislative agenda, killed Truman’s bill as the most senior Democratic lawmakers who led those
committees disagreed with the bill and Truman’s more liberal civil rights policies (Steinmo and
Watts 1995, 343). This connects with explanations espoused by Star (2013) that state it is the
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composition of Congress, specifically committees controlled by senior lawmakers and
procedural rules in the Senate, that defeats healthcare reform. The focus on the power of
congressional committees can be seen in Ford’s attempt to enact universal health coverage as it
had the backings of congressional leaders, but not the members of the committees. Steinmo,
Watts, and Starr all agree the decentralization of Congress and Senate procedural rules are prime
examples of the institutional theory as the need for sixty percent of support from the Senate is
unparalleled in other democracies and a minority of legislators can block meaningful reform.
Incremental Theory
A closely connected, but differing, approach to explain the failure of universal healthcare
attempts is the incremental theory. This approach argues that while institutions play a factor in
preventing the passage of universal health coverage, policies in the US need to build off of each
other, rather than just radically change the current landscape. Berkowitz (2017) argues Truman
failed in his attempt to pass an NHI bill as it would have built off of Social Security, which was
deeply unpopular at the time. Social Security’s unpopularity could be attributed to its low
benefits that were eligible to less than half of the population. Social Security served as an
imperfect and unstable foundation for Truman as instead “one should expand Social Security
first and only then press for national health insurance” (Berkowitz 2017, 523). This connects
with the institutional theory put forth by other scholars as incremental reforms pave the way for
subsequent large reforms. By attempting to dramatically expand the role of Social Security
without expanding populations covered by Social Security, Truman’s failure highlighted how the
incremental theory serves as an explanation for why universal health reform has failed. Truman
failed because he attempted enacting universal health coverage without initially reforming Social
Security. After failing to enact universal health coverage, advocates turned towards incremental
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expansions of Social Security. As private health plans began to emerge as the supplier of health
insurance for many Americans, older and poorer Americans were having difficulty receiving
care. Medicare and Medicaid were able to receive support from lawmakers as they built off the
Kerr-Mills Act, which provided insurance to poor elderly Americans. Medicaid built off of this
by expanding coverage to include the disabled and low-income children (Berkowitz 2017).
Meanwhile, Medicare was able to build off of the newly popular Social Security program, which
was appreciated for “the universal and non-means-tested nature of Social Security” (Skocpol
1995 73). During reform attempts in the 1970s, political actors did not learn from previous failed
efforts as they attempted to enact a universal healthcare system. Political actors, however, began
to learn their lesson as supporters realized “only very low key, incremental efforts had any
chance of success” (Skocpol 1997, 21). Heclo’s (1995) theory of gestation connects to
incrementalism as it explains that successful reform efforts need to have been publicly hashed
out and debated. Through the debate between policy actors, the media, and society, “factual
claims are tested and countered, the ‘problem’ is defined and redefined, and alternatives are
advanced and attacked” (Heclo 1995, 91). Star (2013) touches on this idea as he argues
proponents need to gain enough electoral success over several election cycles to prevent all
attempts to block reform.
Beland, Rocco, and Waddan (2016) utilize the incremental approach to explain how
Obama was able to secure passage of the ACA. During the 2008 election cycle, Obama learned
from the mistakes of past policy actors by not promising universal coverage because it was “seen
as impossible due to existing policy legacies (i.e. the weight of private insurance actors and
interests within the health system), meaning that reform had to build on the inefficient mix of
private and public programs already in place” (Beland, Rocco, and Waddan 2016, 436). After
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analyzing three potential causes for universal coverage failures, high partisanship, institutional
fragmentation, and the complexity of policy packages, they concluded that no one single factor
was the primary reason. They were able to conclude that institutional fragmentation and the
complexity of universal health insurance were more useful explanations for multiple failed
policy attempts. The ACA was able to achieve successful passage not because it overcame these
three barriers, but it never intended to achieve universal coverage (Beland, Rocco, and Waddan
2016). The law succeeded, in terms of enactment, because it “represented an incremental
expansion of the existing system for health-care finance, not a revolutionary change” (Berkowitz
2017, 521). As already stated, the ACA was meant to preserve the public-private insurance
system, not dismantle it.
Presidential Strategy Theory
Lastly, some have argued that it is the consistent flaws in presidential strategy that have
failed to achieve universal health coverage. Schimmel (2016) is an advocate of this approach
since he has examined the rhetoric presidents have used when attempting to enact universal
health coverage and their response to Republican attacks. He focuses on the social imaginary that
presidents have created. The social imaginary is “the ways in which people imagine their coexistence in a national space, and the moral values, relationships, and responsibilities” that relate
to the role and purpose of government (Schimmel 2016, 4). His analysis of presidential rhetoric
rested on the social imaginary, which is how individuals imagine society to exist, presidential
addresses to Congress, and how public discourse either reproduces or challenges the social
imaginary. For example, Schimmel (2016) writes how Clinton’s social imaginary focused on a
slow and steady version of progress that was combined with traditional liberal views of equality.
Schimmel (2016), however, does critique Clinton’s decision not to reevaluate his social
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imaginary after it was clearly failing with public support turning against his plan. In recent
healthcare reform debates, primarily in debates over the ACA, political leaders advocating for
reform strayed from using a moral lens as Obama “favored practical and administrative
arguments about efficiency, economic growth, and economies of scale” (Schimmel 2016, 21).
President Obama’s ability to enact the ACA was aided in the structuring of his social imaginary,
which “champions compromise as a political and moral value itself rather than merely as a
concession to pragmatism” (Schimmel 2016, 223).
Schimmel’s (2016) application of the social imaginary is just one approach explaining
how flaws in presidential strategy doomed universal health coverage. Other approaches have
highlighted the partisan political factors as the main obstacle and seek to explain how a
widespread, bipartisan reform effort gradually transformed into a conversation where
“Republicans were essentially opting out of the process and Democrats were beginning to
wonder where it was even headed” (Clymer, Pear and Toner 1994). Skocpol’s research across
multiple works have focused on the role poor messaging by the Clintons played in his healthcare
reform effort and expands on the institutional factors that have impeded reform. Jacobs and
Skocpol (2010) also provide a comprehensive account of the numerous political obstacles the
ACA had to overcome and how it nearly failed multiple times. Their description helps explain
how the ACA was able to succeed compared to many other healthcare reforms that did not. They
describe the political obstacles Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Reid had to confront
in order to secure a sufficient number of votes for passage. They also explain how policy actors
actually used institutional designs, namely Senate procedural rules, in their favor, especially after
Senate Democrats lost their filibuster-proof majority (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). One of the key
differences in strategy between Clinton and Obama was the ability to hold the Democratic
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caucus together. Clinton was unable to build support for his plan amongst his own political party
as some congressional Democrats “never did agree with their titular leader, or among
themselves, about exactly what kind of reform they wanted” (Skocpol 1997, 99). Even though
there were multiple moments of panic among congressional Democrats during debate over the
ACA, the turning point came when President Obama took ownership of a plan and was able to
utilize Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Reid to secure the votes.
My use of Kingdon’s multiple streams approach will help inform which of these theories
best explains why universal healthcare proposals have failed in the U.S. and paths forward for
advocates.
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Chapter 2: The Multiple Streams Approach, the Health Security Act, and
the Affordable Care Act
In an attempt to analyze and understand the factors that defeated the Clinton health plan
but helped secure passage for the Affordable Care Act, Kingdon’s (2011) multiple streams
approach will serve as the framework for this comparative case study. The multiple streams
approach addresses the policymaking process and the factors that inhibit or enable the enactment
of specific policies and how these issues come to be seen as such. In particular, his approach
focuses on agenda setting, specification of alternatives, authoritative decisions, and
implementation. The multiple streams approach divides the policymaking process into three
distinct streams—the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream. In tracking the
rise and fall of items on the institutional agenda, Kingdon conducted 247 interviews on
transportation and health policy issues between 1976 and 1979 with congressional staff
members, executive branch members, and individuals outside of government, such as lobbyists,
consultants, and researchers. Kingdon selected these respondents by first identifying important
positions, such as congressional staff members and representatives of interest groups, and then
utilizing a snowballing technique in which each respondent listed another individual Kingdon
should interview. During the interviews, Kingdon asked seven questions that aimed to discover
the content of the agenda, seriously considered alternatives, and explanation for the items on the
agenda (Kingdon 2011). These three streams can be applied to the failure of the Health Security
Act and the enactment of the ACA to discover which factors in each stream caused one to fail
and one to succeed. In order to establish this framework as appropriate, the three streams must be
discussed and defined.

The Problem Stream
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The problem stream is a critical component of the multiple streams approach as the
problem needs to be defined and understood, which can elevate its status on the governmental
agenda. First, indicators must be established so elites have a mechanism with which to assess the
magnitude of the problem and discover how it will change. For those who pursue policy change,
it is crucial they establish indicators and utilize them as a way to build consensus that reform is
necessary. Indicators, such as the uninsured rate or healthcare spending as a proportion of GDP,
are not enough to warrant action on their own as they can be manipulated by advocates who
“grasp for indicators with serious deficiencies” and wrongly interpreted as evidence for a
specific problem or solution (Kingdon 2011, 93). Some problems are able to achieve a place on
the agenda through a focusing event, which is a crisis or disaster that calls attention to the
problem. However, focusing events are less common in terms of health problems due to the
already high saliency of health policy. Symbolic acts can also serve as a vehicle to increase the
visibility of problems. This occurs when political elites already have an existing problem on their
mind and the symbol helps provide focus. Unlike a crisis focusing event, symbols are used not to
move a problem onto the agenda, but to “capture in a nutshell some sort of reality that people
already sense in a vaguer, more diffuse way” (Kingdon 2011, 98).
An important component of the problem stream is the ability for feedback. Governmental
actors rely on feedback of existing programs as it is a primary way in which they gain knowledge
of emerging problems. Feedback comes through multiple different forms, such as expenditures,
constituent complaints, casework, systematic monitoring, and evaluation studies. Feedback is
critical as it can reveal problems that were unintended by legislators, such as implementation that
contradicts the intent of the legislation, failure to meet stated goals, higher costs, and
unanticipated consequences. Problems can fall off the agenda after legislators believe they have
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successfully solved the problem, the consequences have decreased, or because political actors
decide to utilize their resources for solving other problems. When it becomes clear that there will
be no legislative or authoritative decision, political actors quickly cease attempts to solve that
problem in an effort to maintain their scarce resources (Kingdon 2011).
The problem stream also emphasizes the role problem definition plays. Problem
definition and its framing is a key factor in this stream as it substantially changes the solutions
that will be proposed by political elites. In relation to the stage of problem definition, actors
typically place their definition of the problem into a specific category. The category the issue is
placed in, such as equal rights or cost containment, will significantly change the proposed
solutions. It is difficult for new categories to emerge as they are seen as a “threat to somebody’s
interests and politicians like to put off that day of reckoning as long as they can” (Kingdon 2011,
112). Eventually however, new categories must be developed as the old categories no longer
accurately portray the problem. All of the aforementioned components of the problem stream
work together to bring problems to the attention of government officials. The interpretation of
indicators assesses the scope and severity of a problem while increasing the attention an issue
receives or altering its perception. The usage of indicators can alter how the problem is defined
by providing quantitative measures whose interpretation makes individuals believe problems
exist on a scale significant enough to warrant public action (Kingdon 2011).

The Policy Stream
Kingdon (2011) compares the policy stream to a cauldron of soup as ideas are like
bubbles, which can become prominent and then fade. The consideration of policies is heavily
influenced by the “softening stage,” in which ideas are considered, bills are formally introduced,
supporters and opponents make speeches, and then proposals are amended, with many ideas
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either combining into one or contrasting one another. The soup, much like policies themselves,
change not only because of the introduction of new elements, but the “recombination of
previously existing elements” (Kingdon 2011, 117). One of the main drivers in the policy stream
are policy communities, which consist of specialists inside and outside of government that
exchange ideas and research a particular topic. Policy communities are affected by political
events, but remain independent from electoral changes and constituent demands, unlike
communities in the politics stream. Policy communities are less concerned with the political
environment and more concerned with researching and constructing policy alternatives and
proposals. While constructing this framework, Kingdon (2011) discovered that the policy
communities in health policy are small and intimate with many specialists, deemed policy
entrepreneurs, working together to develop proposals regarding the problems with healthcare.
Their collaboration reflects the low fragmentation of ideas in the health policy community as the
many different policy entrepreneurs are concerned with three issues—cost, access, and quality.
This common outlook in the policy community is seen throughout the diverse community, with
stakeholders from insurance advocates to biomedical researchers, describing the issue along
these three lines. The low fragmentation in the policy community prevents the health agenda
from abruptly changing (Kingdon 2011).
While the policy “soup” is an important metaphor, it is not a completely accurate
depiction of the policy stream as it places emphasis on the origin of ideas while forgetting that
“Wholly new ideas do not suddenly appear. Instead, people recombine familiar elements into a
new structure or a new proposal” (Kingdon 2011, 124). A crucial step in the policy stream is
policy entrepreneurs “softening up” policy communities and the broader public as it takes time
and effort to educate and build inertia for change among communities and the public. The
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passage of Medicare, which was briefly discussed in the literature review, is a clear example of
how policies build off of each other and need to gather support over a period of time. Policy
entrepreneurs typically target the general public, specialized professionals who would be
affected, and policy communities themselves to assure that as many specialists as possible are
aware of both the problem and policy. Universal healthcare serves as a strong example of the
policy stream process as it has been attempted numerous times since the 1940s. The failure
highlights the degree to which some policies require extensive “softening up.” Further, bills and
proposals may be discussed not to secure passage, but for the purpose of “keeping something
alive” and gaining attention for the policy until it can be passed (Kingdon 2011, 130).
Gaining support among policy communities, however, does not secure passage for a
proposal as Kingdon (2011) argues proposals need to fulfill several criteria while in the policy
stream. While technical feasibility can be a broad criterion, Kingdon’s interviewees defined it as
proposals that are well thought out and detailed, with special attention paid to its ability to be
carried out and accomplish their purported goals. Value acceptability among the policy
community, an important criterion, is heavily influenced by ideology and the principles of equity
and efficiency. Ideology refers to the policy community’s views on the size and role of
government. Kingdon (2011) found that unprompted ideological arguments appeared in 36% of
health policy interviews, significantly higher than transportation policy which only saw these
arguments in 7% of interviews. However, in some instances it is not personal ideology, but
national ideology that shapes value acceptability. National ideology emphasizes the common
political values in the US, such as low levels of trust in government, and frames it in a way that
goes beyond the individual. Value acceptability also includes equity, which can be driven by the
desire to make policies fairer and address power imbalances and can quickly force policies onto
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the agenda. Kingdon (2011), however, discovered that equity was not featured predominately in
discussions of value acceptability as it only appeared in 13% of interviews. Lastly, efficiency has
emerged as a powerful factor in value acceptability as policy makers have begun to consider
more heavily the cost of the program compared to the benefits, whether those benefits are
justified by the costs, and whether the benefits could be delivered for lower costs. The final
criterion that policy communities use within the policy stream is anticipating future constraints.
It is important for the policy community to consider future constraints because specialists expect
policies to face constraints in the future, so they must consider ways for their policy to overcome
and change with those constraints. One such future constraint is a budget constraint as the policy
will not be seriously considered if costs are too high. Another type of constraint is public
acquiescence, or social acceptability. Public acquiescence can refer to either the general public or
a specialized segment of the population that would be heavily affected by the policy. Likewise,
receptivity among elites can both be influenced by and influence public acquiescence. Support
among elites is crucial as specialists often times withdraw proposals because of a lack of political
support. The policy community must consider public acquiescence and elite support when
designing policies as negative reactions from either can endanger the passage of the policy
(Kingdon 2011).
Following the aforementioned processes, policies that survive enter the short list of ideas
within the policy community. Through these processes, the policy community develops
consensus in which specialists are aware of the problem and agree on solutions or proposals.
Respondents have described emerging consensus as a snowball or having a bandwagon effect.
The emerging consensus continues to build until it reaches a tipping point, in which “its diffusion
rises rapidly from those few to the point where the idea becomes commonplace” (Kingdon 2011
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140). This tipping point, however, usually occurs among specialists within the policy community
and is separate from a tipping point that would occur among political actors. However, even
when policies fail to reach the tipping point or reach it but still face barriers to enactment, one
respondent in Kingdon’s survey stated, “Issues fade in and fade out, but they never, ever go
away. They always come back—always” (2011, 141).

The Political Stream
The political stream operates independently of the problem and policy stream and
includes events such as public mood, changes in administration, and interest group activity.
Kingdon (2011) argues the political stream is a critical component of the policy-making process
because it would be misleading to argue the policy-making process only includes the policy
community discussed in the policy stream. Kingdon (2011) identifies three elements of the
political stream that occur before consensus building—national mood, organized political forces,
and governmental phenomena.
The national mood consists of the public holding similar opinions but those opinions can
change and shift over time, which has important impacts on policy. The national mood heavily
influences the policies governmental actors pursue or choose not to pursue as proposals that have
been discussed among elites and policy communities appear once they believe the national mood
has shifted. Swings in the national mood, from left to right and back again, can be considered a
type of feedback cycle in which “a program is enacted, problems with its implementation
emerge, corrections are made, and new problems emerge from the corrections” (Kingdon 2011,
148). For policy actors, the national mood is not just a measure of public opinion, but rather
actors assess the values of the country at that moment in time. Politicians gather the national
mood through communication with their constituents in addition to “interest groups’ leaders both
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in Washington and in the hustings; they read newspaper editorials; they give talks and listen to
questions and comments at meetings; they see how public events are being covered in both
general and specialized media; and they talk to party activists and other politicos who
presumably have their ears to the ground” (Kingdon 2011, 149). The sentiments gathered by
politicians from all these sources provide an understanding of the national mood, which they
then pass onto nonelected officials. Just as the national mood can affect politics, politics can
affect the national mood, especially if an election makes people believe a certain mood is
dominant. The national mood has a significant impact on policy because it can enable previously
dismissed proposals to become viable options (Kingdon 2011).
The second major component of the political stream is organized political forces, which
includes interest groups, elites, and political mobilization. The position of interest groups can
serve as a powerful catalyst in pushing politicians to either support or oppose a certain policy.
When there is agreement among interest groups over a certain policy, politicians side with the
interest groups. However, when there is conflict among interest groups, politicians tend to “strike
some balance between those for and those against a given proposal” (Kingdon 2011, 150). In
regard to health policy, especially when there is conflict among interest groups, hospital groups
are powerful because of their reputation as community leaders, making it very difficult for
politicians to oppose them. When opposition to a certain policy is great enough, interest groups
are not only able to block the policy from being enacted, but from being seriously considered.
This can result in advocates abandoning their policy as the cost of attempting to get it passed is
often too high. Interest groups are often motivated by the clientele that is created following the
creation of a specific program. The clientele aims to block any attempt to decrease funding for
the program or change it in a way they deem as unfavorable. While interest groups are powerful
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at blocking legislation, they can be overcome depending on swings in the national mood,
composition of Congress, and administration (Kingdon 2011).
Lastly, changes in the government, such as elections and battles over jurisdiction, is a
major component of the political stream. Agenda change among governmental actors happens
through elections or changes in personnel as either can force new items onto the agenda or take
others off. Election results and the corresponding changes in the composition of Congress can
cause drastic changes in the agenda. A notable example in health policy is the election of 1964,
which enabled the Johnson administration to secure enough votes for the passage of Medicare
and Medicaid (Kingdon 2011). As parties lose and gain seats in Congress or the White House,
issues will rise and fall from the agenda because of the ideological positions of the new
policymakers. From his interviews in health policy, Kingdon (2011) concluded that a change in
administration can create wide-ranging impacts as it was significantly mentioned in 83% of the
interviews. Turnover in regulatory or bureaucratic agencies can have a similar effect on agenda
items. Kingdon (2011), however, stresses that change in agendas because of turnover is not
because of the loss or gain of the personnel themselves, but the broader shift in mood they
signify. Turf battles between agencies and Congress, or between two agencies, impacts the
agenda as policy positions are often taken based on jurisdiction and interests of the involved
agencies. Universal health coverage is a prime example of a turf battle as multiple congressional
committees have a stake and want to claim jurisdiction, while agencies such as the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) wants to select the cheapest possible option. Turf battles can
negatively affect a policy, particularly if committees and agencies cannot come to an agreement,
or can positively affect it, specifically by motivating committees or agencies into being the first
one to support or introduce the policy. The potential popularity of the policy is the primary
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reason that affects whether jurisdiction positively or negatively impacts policy consideration
(Kingdon 2011).
Whereas consensus building is achieved in the policy stream through persuasion and
evaluation of the policy, the political stream reaches consensus through bargaining and
exchanging of votes and support. By bargaining, policy actors create coalitions that are needed
for bills to be taken into serious consideration. Coalition building ties into the bandwagon effect
discussed in the policy stream. As the coalition builds through promises of benefits, others begin
to join the coalition because they are fearful they will miss some of the benefits. As
bandwagoning increases, opponents of the policy begin to introduce their own proposals as they
are afraid some version of the policy will pass. Considering they want to be included in some of
the benefits, they propose their own policy in an attempt to gain some of the benefits, in what
respondents called “jumping on before it’s too late” (Kingdon 2011, 161). Political bargaining
increases as the likelihood of passage increases because it causes actors on both sides to move
away from the rigid positions in order to compromise.

The Policy Window
The policy window is the convergence of all three streams that allows for advocates to
push their proposal through. The policy window is different from the three streams because it is a
critical juncture that occurs after “a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available
in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and
political constraints are not severe” (Kingdon 2011, 165). The policy window allows for action
to be taken on specific policies, but does not remain open indefinitely, meaning that if
proponents are slow to action their policy window will close. Proponents pursuing action during
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their policy window, however, does not ensure the passage of their policy. Passage during the
policy window depends on the elements that are present (Kingdon 2011).

Figure 5 This is a visual representation of the multiple streams approach and how the streams converge into the policy window
(Gagnon and Labonte 2013).

The policy window typically opens because of events in the problem stream, either a new
problem emerges, or the political stream, where there is a change of elected officials,
administration, or even congressional committee chairs. As the policy window opens, it also
closes when participants believe they have addressed the problem in one form or another, when
advocates fail to secure action due to an inability to invest resources, the event that caused the
window to open ends, a change in personnel closes the window, or there are no available
alternatives. One of the most complex features of the policy window is the difficulty participants
have of knowing when the policy window is open or closed as they have to rely on their
perceptions. A crucial aspect of the multiple streams theory are the policy entrepreneurs who
become a central figure in the attempt to pass a certain policy. These policy entrepreneurs must
have either expertise, the ability to speak for others, and an authoritative decision-making
position, such as the presidency. They must also have political connections or negotiating
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prowess and be persistent in pursuing their policy. It is important to understand how policy
entrepreneurs and the structural elements affect the policy window as “the window opens
because of some factor beyond the realm of the individual entrepreneur, but the individual takes
advantage of the opportunity” (Kingdon 2011, 182).

Applying the Multiple Streams Approach to the Health Security Act and the
Affordable Care Act
After discussing the multiple streams approach, it can now be applied to the attempts to
pass the Health Security Act and the Affordable Care Act. These two bills proposed significant
expansions of the role of government in healthcare and are ideal case studies into understanding
the various factors that impede or accelerate the expansion of government run healthcare
programs.
The Problem Stream, the Health Security Act, and the Affordable Care Act
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, an increasing number of problems emerged in
America’s healthcare system, with much of the focus on the rising costs of health care. A survey
conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1992
concluded that there was “almost unanimous sentiment that the U.S. health-care financing
system is unsatisfactory” (Blankenau 45, 2001). Further, Americans listed cost as their number
one concern in a poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation. In the early 1990s, concerns
over healthcare costs shifted from being an issue primarily among lower-income Americans to a
middle-class issue as employers began to increasingly place more costs on employees (Skocpol
1995). Businesses began to shift costs because owners faced the increased burden of providing
insurance, with health care more than doubling as a share of total compensation from 1970 to
1990 (Blankenau 2001). State and federal governments also struggled with rising costs for
Medicaid and Medicare. Medicaid was of particular significance as it emerged as the fastest
44

rising expenditure in state budgets and was a main driver of the federal debt. Hospital patients
who used private insurance faced even higher costs as hospitals forced them into paying for
uninsured Americans and Medicaid recipients (Plaut and Arons 1994). Concerns over access also
emerged as there were roughly over 39.7 million uninsured Americans, a 26% rise over just five
years (Budetti 2004). In addition to the millions of Americans who lacked insurance, even more
faced limited coverage options. The U.S. underwent an economic recession in 1990-1991, and
with health insurance increasingly tied to employment, “lost jobs soon meant no employer health
insurance for many of the affected families” (Skocpol 25, 1997).
Healthcare was thrust as one of the major problems facing the U.S. after the surprising
electoral victory of Harris Wofford in the Pennsylvania Senate special election in 1991. His
opponent, Republican Richard Thornburgh, was a very popular Republican in the state and was
expected to have an easy path to victory, with Wofford trailing Thornburgh by 44 points in
August of that year. In September, Wofford began to center his campaign around healthcare,
airing an advertisement that concluded with “If criminals have the right to a lawyer, I think
working Americans should have the right to a doctor” (Skocpol 27, 1997). Before the
advertisement aired, many voters saw Thornburgh as having more expertise in healthcare, but
one week before election day Wofford led Thornburgh on the issue by 27 points and won the
election by ten points. Surveys and focus groups conducted during and after the campaign
concluded that Wofford’s support for universal healthcare was a major factor in his victory, with
one survey concluding that 30% of his supporters voted for him because of his stance on
healthcare and another 50% of Pennsylvania voters at the time stated that national health
insurance was one of the two issues that decided their vote (Skocpol 1997). Wofford’s election is
a crucial component of the problem stream as it become the focusing event that highlighted the
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issues with American healthcare because policies are not considered for legislative action until
“problematic socioeconomic conditions are combined with proposed policy solutions and a
widespread sense that the ‘time is ripe’ for political action” (Skocpol 1997, 29). Political pundits
declared healthcare as “the issue for 1992” and the Kaiser Family Foundation, which conducted
one of the aforementioned surveys, argued “national health insurance has arrived as a
mainstream political issue” (Skocpol 1997, 30). Wofford’s election and emphasis on national
health insurance brought national attention to his campaign managers, James Carville and Paul
Begala, both of whom served as campaign strategists for Clinton’s presidential run in 1992.
During the campaign, the Clinton team defined the problem as revolving around high costs and
low access for many Americans as he stated in his announcement speech that “in the first year of
a Clinton Administration we will present a plan to Congress and the American plan to provide
affordable, quality health care for all Americans” (Skocpol 1997, 37). Clinton would use similar
rhetoric throughout his campaign. The issues of higher costs, particularly among middle class
Americans, worked in conjunction with Wofford’s surprise victory to force healthcare reform to
be seriously considered once again.
Prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the same issues of cost and
access were prevalent in 2008 and 2009, but as Kingdon argues, “the problems were much worse
by the time of the 2008 presidential election” (Kingdon 2011, 233). Once again, one of the major
drivers of increased health care costs for states and the federal government were Medicare and
Medicaid. The media focused on the widespread rising costs for a majority of Americans as
those with employer-based insurance faced higher premiums, deductibles, and copays, while
individuals and small businesses were affected by the industry’s refusal to cover people with a
pre-existing condition (Kingdon 2011). Premiums for individuals with employer-based coverage
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increased by 97% between 2000 and 2008, reaching $12,680. Likewise, people who gained
insurance through their jobs saw out-of-pocket spending increase 107% from 2000 to 2008 (The
Kaiser Family Foundation 2008). Kingdon (2011) outlines two additional components on the
problem stream during the 2008 presidential election—the economic recession and globalization.
The 2008 economic recession was the worst economic downturn in the U.S. since the Great
Depression. The scope and magnitude of the recession, coupled with the major role employmentbased insurance played in American healthcare, when one lost their job, their family also lost
health insurance. Thus, health insurance could easily be connected to economic fears especially
because “the recession had opened the window for many programs that would not have been
possible to push without the crisis” (Kingdon 2011, 235). Globalization also played a major role
in the problem stream as American companies were forced to compete with international
companies who did not have to offer insurance to their employees because the government
provided universal health care. Thus, American companies had to push some of the rising costs
of healthcare off to consumers of their products. Business management felt pressure from both
the rising costs and competition from foreign companies and began to support health care reform
in order to reduce the burden on their companies (Kingdon 2011). While these problems existed
during Clinton’s problem stream, particularly an economic recession, these factors were much
more prevalent during Obama’s problem stream.
During the 2008 Democratic primaries, Hillary Clinton and John Edwards were pushing
more ambitious proposals for universal health care and were seen as having higher expertise than
Obama. Obama was hesitant to push for major national reform, which became an issue of
contention between himself and Clinton during the primary. She argued in her rallies that
Obama’s plan “does not, and cannot, cover all Americans. He called his plan universal, then he
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called it ‘virtually universal’ but it is not either” (Jacobs and Skocpol 33, 2010). Obama,
however, won the nomination and made a strategic emphasis on health care reform for the
general election. He began to focus heavily on a renewed promise for comprehensive health care
reform, even as the 2008 economic recession began to worsen. It was a strategic move to utilize
the 2008 economic recession as the focusing event for pursuing comprehensive health care
reform because between 2007 and 2009 five million adults lost health insurance (Holahan 2011).
Obama’s economic stimulus packages recognized the connection between the recession and
health reform as many included health care provisions, signaling the seriousness of the problem.
These provisions included funding for electronic medical records to help modernize the system,
research on healthcare treatments, energy-saving initiatives, and a new electronic grid (Kingdon
2011). Kingdon, Skocpol and Jacobs all argue that the recession enabled Obama to more
effectively pursue health care reform. All have stated that the recession created a renewed
opportunity that Obama could use to push health care reform through.
The Policy Stream, the Health Security Act, and the Affordable Care Act
During the 1992 presidential campaign, the policy community began to focus on
proposals that emphasized the concept of competitive and inclusive managed competition but
included universal coverage and publicly enforced cost controls. Michael Weinstein, a member
of the New York Times editorial board, wrote over two dozen articles advocating for managed
competition as a middle of the road option between proposals from President Bush and
congressional Democrats. Many of the principles of managed competition came from Alain
Enthoven, who was a member of the “Jackson Hole group,” which consisted of like-minded
policy entrepreneurs who were also supporters of managed competition. While the group broadly
agreed on their vision of managed competition, which would utilize market-competition and
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managed care plans to increase efficiency and decrease cost, the group was divided on the role of
government as Enthoven supported some governmental regulations and mandated employer
contributions to health care (Skocpol 1997).
More liberal reformers, notably John Garamendi, Walter Zelman, and Paul Starr, all
advocated for the establishment of “health purchasing alliances”, a policy recommended by
Enthoven, but wanted to sponsor all plans offered to both employers and citizens. The mandatory
alliance would pool the resources of employers and individuals, allowing them to purchase
insurance at a lower price. Plans would have to be approved by alliances before being offered to
individuals. The government would also provide subsidies for unemployed individuals and small
businesses to purchase health coverage, while instituting regulatory mechanisms to hold down
costs. Garamendi, Zelman, and Starr were able to advocate for their view of inclusive managed
care through memos and personal meetings with the Clinton campaign. They argued it would not
expand public insurance programs or require significant tax increases as regulations and
competition would force companies to provide good care at low prices. The plan they advocated
for was “just what Bill Clinton was looking for” (Skocpol 1997, 44).
In January 1993, Clinton formed the Task Force on Healthcare Reform, which aimed to
discover ideas that could be included in a comprehensive health reform plan. The task force,
which was headed by then-First Lady Hillary Clinton, had focused on delivering the exact type
of healthcare reform championed by Garamendi, Zelman, and Starr in which an employer
mandate funded universal coverage along with regulations to keep costs low (Skocpol 1997).
However, the policy “soup” Kingdon describes resulted in new proposals bubbling up.
Conservative Democrat Jim Cooper introduced a rival bill that would encourage small businesses
to purchase insurance and provide some subsidies, but it would not provide universal coverage.
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The Cooperites, the policy community that supported Cooper’s plan, rejected the employer
mandate and government-imposed cost controls. In regard to budget constraints that can affect
the acceptability among the policy community, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), White
House budget officials, and the Treasury Department worked to impose tough cost control
measures that had “much more influence on the specifics of the Clinton Health Security proposal
than did contending conservative, moderate, and liberal political factors” (Skocpol 1997, 67).
Value acceptability also played a role within the policy community as President Clinton framed
the bill not as providing welfare to the poor, but as providing security to the middle class.
There was potential for the Health Security Act to gain consensus among the policy
community, particularly among liberals and budget hawks. They agreed over many important
parts of the proposal, such as the health purchasing alliances, government-caps on premiums, the
employer mandate, and benefit package (Skocpol 1997). However, the proposal failed to gain
diffusion among the policy community as it could not extend support beyond liberals and budget
hawks. Kingdon describes the policy community in disarray over the Clinton health plan, with
policy entrepreneurs unable to unite over a proposal. The Health Security Act emerged as
“complicated, ambitious, and most important of all, unfamiliar and untested” (Kingdon 2011,
236). In addition, the Health Security Act did not fully go through the policy “soup” as described
by Kingdon. The plan that emerged contained many of the basic principles that were supported
by Garamendi, Zelmann, and Starr. The proposal was not debated, combined, or amended like
most policies are at the softening up stage. While there was some movement towards consensus,
it failed to reach a tipping point as it was concentrated within liberals and budget hawks.
Whereas consensus among the policy community was very limited in regard to the Health
Security Act, policy entrepreneurs agreed on the basic approach in what would become the ACA.
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The policy community already had consensus that the major component of the new law would be
its individual mandate, while leaving the existing private-public hybrid system in place. Support
among the policy community for an individual mandate had already reached a tipping point as it
was included in the Health Security Act, Republican alternatives to the Health Security Act, and
every bill reported out of committee during the Obama administration made the mandate central
to their approach (Kingdon 2011). One of the most important factors in the tipping point of
support for the individual mandate was a 2006 Massachusetts law, signed by then-Republican
Gov. Mitt Romney, that imposed a mandate and saw almost all of its residents receive health
insurance. It was easy for the individual mandate to build a consensus and reach a tipping point
because it had been discussed, proposed several times, and previously enacted, allowing policy
entrepreneurs to examine its effects. It was easier for the Affordable Care Act to gain consensus
among the policy community because it had a clear softening up stage as congressional
committees were tasked with “holding many meetings and conferences, producing publications,
honing proposals, introducing bills, and trotting out the idea again in more meetings and
publications” (Kingdon 2011, 237). This was in stark contrast to the Health Security Act as
discussions lead by Hillary Clinton were seen as too secretive and elected officials and interest
groups felt alienated. The policy community that existed during the ACA contained no advocates
of national health insurance who were outside of it and whose calls were not considered by
administration or congressional officials. This connects with two related ideas put forth by
scholars, Kingdon’s “softening up” stage of the policy community and the incrementalism
theory, because national health insurance was still an untested policy that would fundamentally
change the structure of U.S. healthcare. A proposal of that magnitude would require a longer
“softening up” stage and would need to build off of policies that had already expanded the
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government’s involvement in healthcare. The policy community during debates on what would
become the ACA decided to shift away from national health insurance because of the failure of
the Health Security Act, resulting in universal coverage “not being seriously considered”
(Beland, Rocco, and Waden 2016, 436). This in stark contrast to the policy community that
existed during the Health Security Act as many policy entrepreneurs during that period required
plans to obtain universal coverage.
The Affordable Care Act was further able to achieve a greater degree of consensus
among the policy community because it fulfilled many of the criteria explained by Kingdon. The
Affordable Care Act achieved value acceptability because it worked to reform many of the
problems that the policy community widely agreed on, most notably by adding protections for
people with pre-existing conditions. The policy community agreed that insurance companies
should not be able to ban people from obtaining insurance because of a pre-existing condition
but acknowledged that revenue generating policies needed to be enacted to keep spending in
check. This shows how value acceptability can connect with budget constraints as the policy
community wanted to protect individuals but ensure that the budget was taken into consideration.
Thus, they attached the individual mandate so the addition of younger and healthier individuals
who require less healthcare would offset the protections given to people with pre-existing
conditions. This is further seen through the subsides that were given to people to assist with
insurance payments that were offset by the Cadillac tax and increased taxes for the rich.
Technical feasibility was reached because the ACA explained its provisions and payment
mechanisms in a manner that was easier to understand than the Health Security Act. Because the
ACA had fulfilled many of the criteria that exists in the policy stream, many of the proposals that
were developed in the policy soup contained the same basic structure of providing subsidies to
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low-income individuals, providing a public option to buy Medicare, adding an individual
mandate, and keeping the current system largely in place (Kingdon 2011). While these proposals
did differ in specific details, such as a public option or eligibility for Medicaid expansion, the
number of proposals that included similar provisions shows the degree to which the policy
community had established consensus and reached a tipping point (Beland, Rocco, and Wadden
2016).
The Political Stream, the Health Security Act, and the Affordable Care Act
President Clinton’s election itself served as a noticeable shift in the politics stream
because of his emphasis on healthcare reform throughout the 1992 election and the promise from
all the Democratic candidates to pursue reform if elected (Skocpol 1995). The Task Force on
Healthcare Reform completed its work in May 1993; however, Clinton did not fully or publicly
address healthcare reform until a presidential address on September 23, 1993. His presidential
address captured the national mood at that time by primarily focusing on bipartisanship and
remedies for the fears and concerns of the American people. The public was eager for an
increase in bipartisan measures and a decrease in Washington gridlock as “many had hoped a
new Democratic president might be able to do in dealing with a Democratic-led Congress”
(Skocpol 1997, 82). He emphasized how his proposal was bipartisan by combining policy
proposals from both Republicans and Democrats and called on legislators from both parties to
work together. He declared the work members of both parties did as “a magic moment, and we
must seize it” (Clinton 1993). The national mood was characterized by a demand for
bipartisanship and Clinton stressed the cooperation between the two parties to help garner
increased public support.
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Clinton also focused his address on explaining the remedies for concerns and fears over
American healthcare, specifically losing insurance and rising costs. Clinton stressed his proposal
would allay these problems by establishing security, simplicity, savings, choice, quality, and
responsibility. Many Americans were afraid that if they lost their job, they or their whole family
would lose health coverage, thus Clinton made security of having health insurance a vital part of
his speech. He also argued that the healthcare system should be simplified for all actors involved.
Clinton tied in the principle of savings to the idea of inclusive managed competition. Americans
felt frustrated and limited in regard to insurance and provider choice, and Clinton capitalized on
this by arguing that the choice will be left to consumers, “not the boss and certainly not some
government bureaucrat” (Clinton 1993).
National mood, however, is just one part of the political stream as organized political
forces, specifically interest group activity, is another significant component. The Task Force on
Healthcare Reform made a mistake early on during its meetings with stakeholder groups with
financial or occupational roles in healthcare. While members of the task force held hearings and
met with leaders from stakeholder groups in order to discover new ideas and gauge the political
lay of the land, stakeholder groups believed they were getting implicit commitments from the
task force. This was not the intention of the task force, which assumed “that groups would
appreciate being heard, even when not heeded” (Skocpol 1997, 58). This became a point of
contention between interest groups and the designers of the Clinton health plan as they felt
betrayed. Their anger only increased when Clinton’s plan was leaked, enabling to see how few of
their suggestions were included. Coalitions began to form, not in support of the plan, but in
opposition. One of the most influential organized political forces against the Health Security Act
was the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), which consisted of midsized and
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small insurance companies. The HIAA spent between $14 and $15 million opposing the Health
Security Act, which was more than any other interest group. The most successful way they
targeted the health plan were through their portrayal of a middle-class white couple discussing
the limited options imposed by the billion-dollar bureaucracy that was created by the health plan.
HIAA also spent millions on grassroots action targeting insurance company employees, small
businesses, veteran groups, and older citizens. The combination of the two resulted in
“heightened public uneasiness” (Skocpol 1997, 138). HIAA was far from the only organized
political force that opposed the Health Security Act as the American Medical Association,
American Hospital Association, and Federation of American Health Systems also pursued
strategies to decrease support for the plan. These groups were not influential on their own, but
rather it was the combination of all of their activities that opposed specific provisions that
“worked together to sow anxiety about virtually all the core public regulatory features of the
Clinton plan” (Skocpol 1997, 143).
The national mood began to shift because of organized political forces as well as
ideological arguments from Republicans. The Republican campaign against the Health Security
Act capitalized on the widespread popularity of people’s personal medical plans and aimed at
convincing “people to forget concerns about the system as a whole by arousing fears that the
quality of their personal medical care would be fundamentally undermined should the Clinton
plan succeed” (Skocpol 1997, 145). The combination of extreme ideological arguments and
interest group activity not only swayed the national mood but created bandwagoning in
opposition to it. Opponents of the Health Security Act, particularly interest groups, were able to
alter the national mood to their favor as public opinion started to turn against the bill as seen in
the figure below.
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Figure 6 Public support for the Health Security Act was originally strong with 59% of Americans supporting. However,
opposition grew in February 1994 and by June 50% opposed the bill (Skocpol 1997).

A major factor of the Affordable Care Act’s political stream was the change in
government that occurred with the 2008 election. The election provided Democrats with a
majority in the House of Representatives and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. While
Clinton also saw a majority in both chambers, he did not have a 60-seat majority in the Senate,
which was a significant advantage for Obama as it meant the Affordable Care Act could pass
with zero Republican votes (Kingdon 2011). However, the 60-seat majority that Democrats held
in the Senate served as both a blessing and a curse as Democratic leadership was forced to cater
to the needs of each individual Senator as “every single Senator can, in effect, hold up the entire
body” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010, 64). This happened just a few weeks before the entire Senate
voted on the Affordable Care Act as Sen. Lieberman, an Independent who caucused with the
Democrats, warned on a televised appearance that he could withdraw his support for the bill,
which would prevent its passage, prompting a quickly scheduled meeting with White House
officials (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). Other conservative and moderate Democratic senators, such
as Levin (MI), Landrieu (LA), and Nelson (NE) were able to extract special provisions for their
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constituency in exchange for votes as the ACA needed the support of every Democratic senator
(Frates 2009). Another important governmental phenomenon is the battle over jurisdiction
between governmental actors. Initially, there was cooperation between congressional Democrats
and experts in the CBO, especially since Obama appointed former CBO director Peter Orszag as
director of the Office of Management and Budget, which develops fiscally sound proposals.
Conflict occurred between Democrats and the CBO when the CBO refused to release
preliminary scores for different packages Democrats wanted (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).
Just as governmental phenomenon provided Democrats with the legislative seats to enact
comprehensive healthcare reform, the 2010 special election of Republican Scott Brown
endangered passage of the ACA. After his surprise election to the Massachusetts Senate seat,
Democrats believed the national mood had turned against them as voters were “worried about a
poor economy with vanishing job and sluggish commerce, and irritated that all the DC
politicians seemed to be talking about were unsavory deals to complete a huge, expensive,
incomprehensible health reform” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2011, 104). Thus, in order for the ACA to
pass, the House would either have to pass the exact same bill or the agreed upon adjustments
could be passed through the reconciliation process in the Senate, which only required a majority
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).
Legislators had to remain cognizant of the national mood, especially during the initial
stages of designing the new health reform law. During the summer congressional recess in 2009,
legislators faced explosive town halls with many angry constituents. These anti-reform protests
utilized extreme rhetoric, such as comparing Obama to Nazis and claiming that “death panels”
would decide who lived and died and started to turn public support against health reform.
Legislators and White House officials began to consider pursuing more moderate healthcare
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reform measures, but in a televised speech in September of 2009, Obama once again made the
argument for comprehensive health reform which has been credited with improving public
opinion and encouraging congressional committees to resume work on health care reform.
During his speech, he reframed the debate over the ACA as either “doing something versus
accepting a despised and unworkable status quo” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010, 54). Obama’s
speech and the several town halls he hosted throughout the country in 2009 allowed for
constituents to address their concerns (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). Holding town halls and
listening to citizens’ concerns is an essential part of measuring the national mood and shaping it
to gain support for policies. President Clinton failed to adequately address the national mood as
there was little communication between supporters of the Health Security Act and the general
public. The policy and political actors behind the Health Security Act did not directly engage
with the public, leading for the public to believe that “the great health care debate of 1994 never
took place” (Yankelovich 1995, 10). This highlights how the national mood is fluid and can
significantly impact the political stream and can be impacted by it.
The policy actors supporting Affordable Care Act took a different approach by delegating
initial responsibility to Congress and bargaining with organized political forces. Clinton and his
Task Force on Healthcare Reform took the lead in designing the Health Security Act, essentially
sidelining Congress and organized political forces. Obama, however, was not entirely removed
from the process as he set broad requirements the new law would need at a White House forum.
From then on, Congress had the primary responsibility of developing the law while Obama
hosted several town halls around the country on the topic of healthcare reform. Recognizing the
failure of the Health Security Act, Obama and the White House made a concerted effort to give
Congress the primary leadership role, allowing Congress to “weave its ungainly way toward
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actual legislation by building the necessary coalitions to enact it through five committees and the
entire House and Senate in less than a year” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2011, 56). While there were
trade-offs in regard to Obama’s hands-off approach, such as missed congressional deadlines and
feelings of abandonment among grassroots allies, it was crucial for Obama to utilize a strategy
that was different from Clinton if he wanted to succeed. Legislation crafted by Congress has the
highest chance of passage because if “congressional committees draft the bills and then meld the
different versions, members of Congress will have a personal stake in the outcome” (Kingdon
2011, 241).
One of the most significant components of the political stream was the bargaining that
took place between Obama, White House officials, and congressional Democrats and organized
political forces. White House officials such as Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and Senate Finance
Committee Chair Max Baucus developed a plan to “keep powerful groups at the table [and]…
prevent them from allying against [Obama] as they did against Clinton” (Jacobs and Skocpol
2011, 68). Legislators and government officials worked closely together to alter legislation
following feedback from political forces such as healthcare providers, big drug companies, and
private insurers. Healthcare provider groups such as the AMA and the AHA agreed to support
the ACA as the payoffs they would receive were greater than the cuts. It was especially crucial to
get support from the AMA, which opposed comprehensive health reform for the past half
century. Interest groups representing drug companies and private insurers engaged in intense
bargaining with Democrats, with neither side obtaining all of the measures they desired. White
House officials framed the ACA as necessary for healthcare stakeholders as they would receive
increased business from the individual mandate, which would help offset the money they were
giving up. After the election of Brown in 2010 imperiled the ACA, interest groups concluded
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they “wanted something rather than nothing to pass” and worked together to make a concerted
final push in support of the law (Jacobs and Skocpol 2011, 111).
Kingdon (2011) concludes that the more favorable attitudes of interest groups,
composition of Congress, and the strategic decisions of the Obama administration made passage
more likely than during the Clinton administration.
The Convergence of the Three Streams and the Policy Window
As Kingdon (2011) stated, when the policy window opens, it does not remain open for
long. The Health Security Act briefly had a policy window, but Clinton and his advisors did not
act fast enough. Following Clinton’s presidential address, several media events, and the
introduction of the Health Security Act in Congress, the policy window was open as the problem
was clearly defined around cost and access, the policy community among liberals and deficit
hawks supported the bill, and there was bipartisan willingness to cooperate. However, Clinton
and his advisors became distracted by other events, specifically violent conflicts internationally
in Somalia, Moscow, and Haiti as well as a concerted focus on the passage of the North
American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Clinton wasted political capital on NAFTA, which was not
popular in the Democratic caucus. Instead of pursuing an extensive campaign to build a coalition
around the Health Security Act, Clinton waged “an all-out campaign of public persuasion and
Congressional arm-twisting just when he should have been devoting his time to explaining his
health reform to the American people” (Skocpol 1997, 79). Comprehensive health reform was
also pushed aside by budget negotiations that took place over the course of summer 1993. The
White House doomed healthcare reform as “from May onward the White House put healthcare
reform on hold and-more important- pulled it back into secrecy” (Skocpol 1997, 81). White
House officials purposively kept details secret as they feared that opposition would easily mount,
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but in keeping the plan secret they deprived people of learning about the plan. Clinton and his
allies did not seriously push for passage of the Health Security Act until spring 1994, nearly a
year after the task force completed its work. By that point in time, the national mood and
organized political forces had turned against reform (Skocpol 1997).
The passage of the ACA shows that Obama and allies were able to take advantage of the
policy window that opened. The ACA benefited from more favorable conditions in all three
streams as the problems of U.S. healthcare worsened, there was more widespread agreement over
the basic structure of reform, greater willingness among organized political forces to bargain,
and a more Democratic Congress. Obama and allies were able to capitalize on the opening of the
policy window because of smart strategic decisions and increased unity over healthcare reform.
Unlike Clinton, Obama did not wait months to try and enact comprehensive healthcare reform
like his advisors suggested, and instead included healthcare reform in his first budget. After
convening a White House summit on healthcare, he tasked and encouraged congressional
committees to assemble bills that followed his broad requisites. There was also unity among
Democrats and the policy community among these requisites, which stood in stark contrast with
the Clinton plan as only liberals and budget deficits hawks were in support. Further, interest
groups were more willing to work to pass comprehensive healthcare reform, especially as they
had a formal seat in negotiations and bargaining over specific provisions. With these three
streams working together, the policy window opened, however that does not ensure passage.
Obama and his allies worked together to achieve passage while the policy window was still open.
They recognized it would not stay open forever, and realized they had the greatest chance of
success during his first year. By delegating to Congress with drawing up the legislation, it
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allowed for Obama to work on other priorities, such as the economic recovery, but still exert
presidential leadership and guide the process (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).
Paths Forward
After comparing the passage of the ACA with the failure of the Health Security Act
through the multiple streams framework, advocates of universal health coverage need to pursue a
strategy similar to Obama’s. Advocates will need to work closely with organized political forces
to compose legislation that can be enacted. Political forces, as exemplified with the Health
Security Act, can wage extensive campaigns against universal coverage and failure to actively
work with these groups will increase the difficulty in passing universal coverage. In dealing with
political forces, specifically interest groups, advocates must actively bargain with these groups
and propose enough benefits to outweigh the costs. Obama and his allies learned from the failure
of the Clintons by openly bargaining with these stakeholders. Secondly, advocates must realize
the best time to propose universal health coverage and have the political acumen to act when
needed. Health care, specifically issues with cost and access, have long been salient issues, and
as discussed previously these issues have continued to plague U.S. healthcare. The problem
stream is already relevant, but advocates must learn from the lessons of the Health Security Act
and take action when the time is right. Advocates must prioritize universal healthcare if they
want legislation to be enacted. In drafting legislation, advocates need to combine the approaches
of Clinton and Obama. Clinton was criticized for too much executive involvement, while Obama
was criticized for too little involvement. Further, Obama faced criticism for not providing clear
leadership or direction when obstacles occurred, particularly during Brown’s special election
victory. Advocates must allow the president to set a broad baseline for legislation that Congress
will draft and build coalitions within the legislature and provide clear executive leadership that
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can guide the legislative process. However, advocates of universal healthcare face the obstacle of
incrementalism, which as discussed previously, suggests that universal healthcare proposals
continuously fail because reform happens gradually and must build off of existing systems.
Advocates must take into account the influence of incrementalism when designing the proposal
in the policy stream, otherwise it will most likely suffer the same fate as proposals from Truman,
Clinton, and many others.
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Chapter 3: Applying the Multiple Streams Approach to Medicare for All
Considering the issues in the healthcare system that were outlined advocates have made a
renewed push for comprehensive health reform, with proposals to establish universal health
coverage dominating the conversation among liberal politicians. The most prominent proposal
has been Medicare for All, which would mainly eliminate private health insurance and cost
sharing in favor of a government funded and administered program. A bill was formally
introduced by Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders (I) during the 116th Congress. Sanders and several
other former candidates in the 2020 Democratic presidential primary have expressed support for
single-payer healthcare, although there is much variety in their proposed plans (Medicare for All
Act of 2019). To better understand the policy context and environment in which Medicare for All
is being discussed, I will utilize Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. Kingdon’s multiple
streams framework is relevant for the same reasons as discussed because it addresses the
policymaking process and factors that can influence the passage of legislation.

The Problem Stream
While I have already described the problem in my first chapter, I will expand upon the
arguments and information I laid out in that chapter because actions by President Trump and his
administration have exacerbated current issues. After Trump’s election, which gave Republicans
complete control of the federal government, it was widely expected they would attempt to repeal
the ACA as they were able to pass a partial repeal in 2015, which Obama vetoed (Haberkorn
2016). The American Health Care Act passed in the House of Representatives on a party-line
vote of 217 to 213 and would have phased out funding for Medicaid expansion, removed the
individual and employer insurance penalties, allowed insurers to increase costs for sick
individuals and set aside $8 billion for states to partially reduce their increased premiums (Jost
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2017). Any efforts to partially repeal and replace the ACA were more complicated in the Senate
as Republicans did not have the 60 votes to overcome a Democratic filibuster and utilized the
reconciliation process so only 51 votes were needed. The Senate considered three different
proposals to repeal and replace the ACA. First, there was the Better Care Reconciliation Act,
which would have allowed insurers to deny coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions.
BCRA failed with all Democrats and nine Republicans voting against it. The second option, the
Obamacare Repeal and Reconciliation Act, would have repealed Medicaid expansion, the
individual mandate, and premium subsidies. This, however, also failed with 55 votes against and
45 in favor. The last option was the so-called “skinny repeal”, which would only repeal the
individual and employer mandates. The skinny repeal had the greatest odds of passage, but also
failed with three Republican senators voting against it in addition to the entire Democratic
caucus (Park, Parlapiano, and Sanger-Katz 2017). Since these efforts have failed, the Trump
administration has shifted strategies by primarily undermining the ACA through executive
action. These actions have contributed to worsening the issues of cost and access.
The only major enacted legislation related to the ACA was the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 which contained two major provisions regarding the ACA and health policy. First, the bill
repealed the individual mandate penalty, which required individuals who did not have insurance
to pay a tax penalty. The bill also limited the federal deduction for individuals paying state or
local taxes to $10,000, which could cause states that have more generous Medicaid programs to
“exert greater tax effort to sustain their current spending on the program” (Thompson, Gusmano,
and Shinohara 2018, 402). The CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that
repealing the individual mandate would increase the uninsured rate by 13 million by 2027 and
increase premiums in the health exchanges by 10% nearly every year for the next decade. The
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individual mandate’s penalty was the primary reason why many individuals obtained insurance,
and with its elimination these people no longer have any incentive to pay for health insurance
and makes other provisions difficult to sustain financially (Congressional Budget Office 2017).
Beyond repealing the individual mandate, the Trump administration has implemented
several policies through executive action aimed at limiting the potential impact of the ACA. The
administration has sought to reduce the number of individuals enrolling in the insurance
exchanges by reducing the advertising budget for enrollment, shortening the enrollment and
application period from three months to a month and a half, and cutting the funds allocated for
enrollment assistance (Thompson, Gusmano, and Shinohara 2018; Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities 2020). These policies aimed at decreasing enrollment are likely to have adverse effects
on the stability of the exchanges as “the exchanges will require sufficient levels of enrollment,
including enrollment from young or otherwise healthy individuals who might be less likely to
purchase health insurance” (Government Accountability Office 2018, 1-2). The Trump
administration and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have issued new rules
that allow employers to shift employees to individual health plans, which can create issues due to
the complexity of the individual marketplace. Employers with a sicker workforce are more likely
to take advantage of this, which would increase premiums for everyone and cost $51 billion over
ten years. Further, CMS announced states could alter subsidy structures that help individuals
obtain insurance. Currently, subsidies are based on income, but CMS is encouraging states to
create a new subsidy based on age, rather than income, and it would be a flat tax credit (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities 2020).
The Trump administration has also jeopardized the insurance markets by approving
association health plans (AHPs), which do not have to fulfill the regulations imposed by the
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ACA. The ACA created many new regulations for insurance plans that were aimed at protecting
people with pre-existing conditions, ensuring plans covered essential benefits, and providing
protections against bankruptcy due to illness. The rules previously allowed individuals to enroll
in an AHP for three months, but they did not cover all of the benefits that long-term plans must
follow according to the ACA. However, the Trump administration has changed this by allowing
individuals to stay in an AHP for up to a year with the possibility of renewing the plan. The
expansion of AHPs threaten to destabilize the insurance market because they can offer lower
premiums than the individual exchange, siphoning off healthy enrollees who will now receive
fewer benefits. When these healthy individuals abandon their more comprehensive health
insurance for AHPs, they make it costlier to insure individuals with pre-existing conditions who
cannot leave their comprehensive plans. The individual market relies on healthy people because
without them, costs increase due to the greater number of older and sicker people. Further, these
plans offer worse benefits and enrollees could be subject to catastrophic costs when they face
coverage gaps (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2020).
The Trump administration’s decision to end the cost-sharing-reduction (CSR) payments
has directly increased costs for many consumers. Under President Obama, the government gave
CSR payments to insurers to compensate for insurance reductions given to low and middleincome enrollees in the exchanges. President Trump, however, ceased CSR payments to insurers
in October 2017 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2020). Following the elimination of
CSR payments, many insurers withdrew from the exchanges, while insurers increased premiums
by an average of 20% (Kamal et al. 2017). The CBO reported that in addition to premium hikes
for individuals in the exchanges, 1 million people would lose insurance within one year and the
federal deficit would increase by $194 billion over ten years (Center on Budget and Policy
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Priorities 2020). Eliminating CSR payments increases the federal deficit because insurers are
then forced to increase premiums for individuals in the exchanges, requiring the federal
government to pay more in tax credits for individuals who receive subsidies (Congressional
Budget Office 2018).
While each of these policies implemented by the Trump administration have done
damage, the combination of all have worsened the problems of cost and access that were
previously discussed. The CBO and JCT report that there were 29 million uninsured Americans
below 65 in 2018, which will climb to 35 million by 2028. Federal health coverage subsidies for
Americans under 65, which were $685 billion in 2018, are projected to increase at an average
rate of 6% every year and cost $1.2 trillion by 2028. The exchanges and nongroup market have
stabilized despite the many policies the Trump administration have pursued, but premiums are
expected to increase by an average of 7% each year over the next decade. Even though a
majority of Americans will still receive coverage through their employer by 2028, nearly 4
million Americans are estimated to lose their employment-based coverage either because of the
elimination of the individual mandate or premiums that are rising faster than wages. Medicaid
and CHIP are expected to cover 25% of the under 65 population by 2028, although 1/3 of those
eligible for Medicaid will not receive it because they do not reside in a state that has expanded
Medicaid (Congressional Budget Office 2018). Healthcare is projected to become an even larger
share of GDP, increasing from 17.8% in 2019 to 19.4% by 2027, with cumulative health care
spending totaling $6.0 trillion. Expenses for both Medicare and Medicaid are expected to grow
faster than private insurance between 2020 and 2027 due to an increase of older and sicker
enrollees who will need more healthcare services (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
2019).
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As expected, advocates of universal healthcare have primarily defined the problems with
U.S. healthcare in terms of poor access, high costs, and underperforming quality throughout
press conference speeches, press releases, congressional speeches, and congressional hearings. In
defining the problem along these issues, they have relied on a combination of indicators,
measurements, and personal stories in order to fully capture the scope of the problem (Jayapal
2019; Original Jurisdiction Hearing: Medicare for All 2019; “Senator Bernie Sanders Speech”
2019; “Senator Sanders News Conference” 2017). Advocates have also begun to define the
problem beyond the scope of cost, access, and quality as they have placed blame on insurance
and drug companies, raised concerns over the inefficiencies related to administrative costs and
over reliance on emergency medicine, argued the US lags behind other countries, and stated that
healthcare is a human right. In speeches and testimony, advocates have decried the immoral
insurance and drug companies who have earned billions in profits from the current healthcare
system while working Americans are going bankrupt (Original Jurisdiction Hearing: Medicare
for All 2019). The CEO of UnitedHealth was a recurring example as they had an income of $82
million (Jayapal 2019; “Senator Bernie Sanders Speech” 2019). During a 2017 press conference
introducing the bill, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) stated “Too many insurance companies
continue to value profits more than the value of the people they are supposed to be helping. It is
time for something better” (“Senator Sanders News Conference” 2017). Advocates have also
defined the problem as unique to the U.S. as other countries have forms of universal health
coverage and have better access and quality while paying less, with Sen. Sanders tapping into the
idea of American leadership as he said “As proud Americans, our job is to lead the world on
health care, not to be woefully behind every other major country” (“Senator Sanders News
Conference” 2017). Most prominently, advocates have framed health care as a human right that
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everyone deserves, not a privilege that can be bought as Sen. Mazie Hirono (D-HI) stated this
seven times during her speech (“Senator Sanders News Conference” 2017). This argument has
appeared most frequently across speeches in support of Medicare for All with supporters stating
that they are fighting for basic human rights. Congressional representatives, medical
professionals, and advocates have coupled their statements with measurements and personal
stories that provide credibility to their claim that health insurance is currently a privilege
(Original Jurisdiction Hearing: Medicare for All 2019). By defining the problem as a human
rights violation, rather than just focusing on cost and coverage, advocates are able to generate a
powerful message about the current structure of healthcare in the US.

The Policy Stream
Currently in the 116th Congress, there have been two different proposals that would
establish universal healthcare by expanding Medicare to all Americans. Both are entitled the
Medicare for All Act of 2019, but the two versions do contain some difference. The Senate
version (S.1129) was introduced by Sen. Sanders, while Rep. Jayapal introduced the House
version (H.R.1384). While several Democratic presidential candidates have put forth their own
universal healthcare proposal, with many different variations of Medicare for All, I will focus on
the two formal plans that have been introduced as legislation in the 116th Congress in February
and April 2019. I will first discuss Sen. Sanders version as he introduced it in 2019 and then
discuss some of the differences between the two.
Under Sanders’ Medicare for All Act of 2019, the government would become the chief
financier of insurance and provide it to all Americans upon birth, who would receive a Universal
Medicare card. Medicare for All would establish a Universal Medicare Agency within the
Department of Health and Human Services to administer healthcare. While private and employer
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insurance is allowed, it can only be used as supplemental insurance to cover benefits not
included under Medicare for All. Since Medicare for All would cover all citizens, it would
eliminate other government programs, such as Medicaid, CHIP, TRICARE, federal employee
health insurance and the exchanges established by the ACA. These programs would be
terminated at the start of the fourth year after the bill is enacted. It would, however, keep the
Veterans Administration and Indian Health Service separate, at least for ten years. The bill
includes a comprehensive list of benefits, including inpatient and outpatient hospital services,
ambulatory services, primary and preventive treatment, prescription drugs, mental health
services, substance abuse treatment, reproductive care, pediatrics, oral care, vision, audiology,
and institutional long-term care. Americans would not pay any type of cost sharing for these
benefits, including no deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance. There is an exception, however,
to prescription drugs, but the government will negotiate the price of the drugs with
pharmaceutical companies. Upon negotiating prescription drug prices, the Secretary would create
a formulary, which is a list of all the prescription drugs. The formulary would be used to
encourage “best practices” for prescribing them and promote the usage of generics. Under Title
III of the bill, providers would have to sign non-discriminatory agreements and would be subject
to both national and state standards, which would include quality of facilities,
comprehensiveness and continuity of services, and patient satisfaction. The Secretary of the
Universal Medicare Agency would develop guidelines, policies and procedures related to
eligibility, enrollment, benefits, provider participation, funding levels, and provider payment
amounts. The bill also establishes regional offices throughout the country that would work with
the Secretary in the implementation and evaluation of universal healthcare. The bill also
explicitly mentions the Secretary should collaborate with various stakeholders that form the
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health policy community. Existing governmental entities, such as the Center for Clinical
Standards and Quality and the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality, will take the lead in
quality assessment of the services provided under the bill. The Center for Clinical Standards and
Quality will also be tasked with investigating health disparities along racial, ethnicity,
socioeconomic, gender and geographic groups. The Universal Medicare Agency will create an
annual budget containing funds needed for all health expenditures, quality assessments,
administrative costs, and education. The bill would maintain the current system of Medicare
payments, fee schedules, but will allow experimentation to continue with alternative payment
structures. Title VII establishes the Universal Medicare Trust Fund, which would contain the
budgets of current government-run health programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid (Medicare
for All Act of 2019; Health Over Profit 2017; Sanders 2019b).
One of the most significant components of the Medicare for All Act of 2019 is how it
will transition the US into a single-payer healthcare system, characterized by public insurance for
all with care delivered by private health providers, such as doctors and hospitals. In the first year
of enactment, only individuals over the age of 65 will automatically be enrolled in Medicare for
All. For individuals under the age of 65, they will have several options, which include keeping
their current insurance, whether it is private or public. Individuals in the exchanges, however,
will be transitioned into Medicare Transition Plans, which serves as a public option. Only
individuals between the ages of 55 and 64 could choose to purchase a Transition Medicare Buyin plan in the first year, with people between the ages of 45 and 54 eligible for that plan in the
second year of enactment. This trend continues in the third year as residents between the ages of
35 and 44 can enroll then. During the first three years, these individuals can keep their current
insurance, but upon the fourth year they will be transitioned into Medicare for All (Health Over
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Profit 2017; Medicare for All Act of 2019; Sanders 2019b). While the bill does not contain
explicit information on funding, Sen. Sanders released a document explaining potential revenue
sources. These revenue sources included establishing a 4% income-based premium paid by
employees or a 7.5% percent one paid by employers, increasing the progressive tax rate up to
70% for income above $10 million, taxing inheritances valued over $1 billion at a rate of 77%,
and proposing taxes on “extreme wealth” (Sanders 2019c).
Rep. Pramila Jayapal’s bill is extremely similar to the one described above as it would
automatically cover all Americans, eliminate other governmental programs, keep the HIS and
VA separate from single-payer care, allow private insurers to cover additional services, prohibits
cost-sharing, and establishes a Medicare Trust Fund where funds for government programs
would be deposited in the first year. However, there are a few important differences between the
two bills. First, Jayapal’s bill would utilize a two-year transition to Medicare for All, instead of
the four-year transition used in Sanders’ version. Individuals who are under the age of 19 or over
the age of 55 will be enrolled in Medicare for All in the first year, with all other individuals
enrolled in the second year. This bill also contains a more generous list of covered benefits,
which includes all long-term care and dietary and nutritional therapies as well as no out-ofpocket costs for prescription drugs. Another important distinction is how the two bills would pay
providers as Sanders’ bill keeps in place Medicare’s fee schedules, while Jayapal’s establishes a
global budget for payments institutional providers, such as hospitals, skilled nursing facilities,
and others. Under this provision, institutional providers would receive one lump sum payment
for all covered operating expenses, which includes wages and salaries, prescription drugs,
purchase of medical devices and supplies, patient care, education, and administrative costs
(Jayapal 2019; Keith 2019; Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384; Roamer and Minium
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2019). Despite the differences between the two bills, they are extremely similar and both would
establish the same form of universal healthcare.
However, Medicare for All is not the only policy to expand healthcare that is being
debated in the policy community. Several advocates are pushing for more incremental measures
as some believe private insurance should still exist. The two legislative proposals that would
expand coverage, yet not at the rate Medicare for All would, are the Medicare for America Act
of 2019 (HR 2452) and a federal public option, which has been proposed in several bills. The
Medicare for America Act of 2019 would establish a federal health program but allows
individuals to opt out in favor of qualified employment-based or private insurance plans (The
Kaiser Family Foundation 2019). HR 2452 was introduced by Reps. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and
Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) and was based on proposals from the Center for American Progress,
Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker, and analyst Jon Walker (Cohn 2019). This proposal, and a
similar one from former Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg, have typically been
defined as “Medicare for all who want it” (Scott 2019). Under the bill, individuals with
Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP would be enrolled in this plan and would have some amount of
cost sharing unless their income is below 200% of the FPL (The Kaiser Family Foundation
2019). The most important distinction between HR 2452 and the proposals advanced by Sanders
and Jayapal is that the former maintains a role for private insurance in providing employmentbased coverage and Medicare Advantage plans (Statement of Tricia Neuman, Pathways to
Universal Health Coverage 2019). Another more incremental approach that has received
attention is the establishment of a public option, which was discussed during debates over the
ACA. Proposals featuring a public option are different from the Medicare for America Act of
2019 because they do not automatically enroll all eligible individuals and keep intact all current
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forms of public insurance, like Medicare and Medicaid, as well as private insurance. There are
currently four bills in Congress that would establish a public option and it has the backing of two
Democratic presidential candidates. The public option would create a Medicare-like program that
exchange-eligible individuals could enroll in for better coverage at a lower cost. Proposals differ
in the eligibility as some restrict it to exchange-eligible individuals only, while others expand it
to large and small employers or to those with private insurance (Oberlander 2019; Statement of
Tricia Neuman, Pathways to Universal Health Coverage 2019). Medicare for All proposals and
these more incremental measures highlight the “policy soup” component of the policy stream
Kingdon discussed. These policies are being debated and contested by the policy community
and, ultimately, will undergo a period of change and recombination with other policies.
Policy analysis is an important component of Kingdon’s multiple streams approach as
policies must be discussed and debated within the policy community. By utilizing several
evaluative criteria and analyses of Medicare for All, I will conduct my own policy analysis to
contribute to the policy community. I have selected criteria from Bardach’s eightfold path, which
serves as a detailed approach to policy analysis. Bardach identifies three evaluative criteria
relevant to health policy—efficiency, equality, and freedom. Political feasibility is a significant
criterion and is discussed later in the politics stream section. Efficiency refers to the extent to
which the benefit is greater than the cost from a monetary perspective. For this analysis,
efficiency is measured as the cost of the proposal and its ability to transition individuals from
their current plan to Medicare for All. Two other important evaluative criteria are equality and
freedom. Bardach argues equality is best understood through practical examples of seeing how
low-income groups or racial minorities may be disadvantaged because of a new policy. For this
analysis, equality will refer to the degree that individuals gain access to insurance, as well as the
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distribution of the economic costs and effects across disadvantaged groups. Likewise, freedom is
a broad concept that includes free markets and economic freedom, free speech, and religious
freedom, but will be measured by the amount of choice individuals would have under Medicare
for All. Process values refers to the degree to which individuals have the opportunity to provide
input on a proposed policy and will be considered as a component of freedom. This can provide
not only more legitimacy to the policy but can improve it because of the wide variety of input
one would receive (Bardach 2012).
The table below summarizes the cost assessment of several different studies analyzing
Medicare for All or other similar single-payer proposals. Blahous (2018) and Pollin et al (2018)
used the 2017 version of the Medicare for All Act, while Blumberg et al. (2019) and Liu and
Eibner (2018) used a general single-payer system with comprehensive benefits and no costsharing.
Study

Payment Rate

Savings

Projected
Utilization
Increases among
privately insured,
elderly, and
uninsured

Total Health
Expenditures
Between $27.7 and
$38.8 trillion over ten
years

Blahous 2018

60% of private
insurance

$846 billion from
prescription drugs
and 7-point
reduction in
administrative costs

Blumberg et al.
2019

Either 115% or
140% of Medicare
rates

Administrative costs
of either 3% or 6%

Capacity either
expands to meet
demand or
decreases

Between $32.5 and
$36.9 trillion over ten
years

Liu and Eibner
2019

124% for hospitals
and 107% for
physicians

Decreased
prescription drug
spending and
administrative costs
save $743.3 billion

50% of new
demand is unmet or
there is no unmet
demand

Between $3.89 and $4.2
trillion per year

Pollin et al. 2018

Current Medicare
rates (78% of
private insurance)

Savings of 19.2%

Utilization increases
among non-elderly,
elderly, and
uninsured

$2.93 trillion per year

Figure 7 Estimates for Medicare for All have ranged from $27.7 to $42 trillion over ten years depending on the author's
methodology.
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After analyzing some of the potential costs of Medicare for All and single-payer
healthcare, the proposals can be evaluated utilizing the evaluative criteria that was discussed
earlier. Medicare for All faces several efficiency issues because of its attempt to transition from a
hybrid public-private insurance system to an entirely public system. The most challenging part of
the transition will be for the 185 million Americans who receive private insurance. The bill
remains vague as to how these individuals will be transitioned from their current coverage to
Medicare for All in a two-year period under Jayapal’s bill or a four-year period under Sanders’,
which may not be enough time for patients, providers, and regulators to adapt to these changes
(Liu and Eibner 2019). Due to the scope of change Medicare for All would impose on American
healthcare, a substantial phase-in period is needed (Blumberg et al. 2019). The federal
government would need an additional $2.7 trillion in revenue to administer the program just in
the year 2020. Over a ten-year period, the federal government will need to raise between $30.6
trillion and $34.9 trillion in additional revenue (Blumberg et al. 2019). The Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget (2019) proposed potential funding sources, which include reducing
federal non-health spending by 80% or instituting a 32% payroll tax, while Pollin et al. (2018)
argue revenue could be raised through some measures such as an increase in taxes for nonnecessary goods and an 0.38% tax on net-worth over $1 million. However, Medicare for All
could provide savings and reduce national health expenditures by $458 billion annually. A
significant amount of savings would be derived from instituting a unified billing and
administrative system. The unified billing and administrative system utilized by Medicare is
significantly more efficient than private insurance companies, as administrative costs for
Medicare comprise 2.2% of the budget compared to 12.4% for private insurance companies.
Utilizing Medicare’s administrative system under single-payer coverage could provide savings of
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$219 billion. Significant savings could be further gained by negotiating pharmaceutical prices,
which would reduce costs by $180 billion (Galvani et al. 2020). While these savings would
generate net benefits, there are concerns regarding the costs that Medicare for All would impose.
These costs go beyond total health expenditures and include macroeconomic costs. Increasing
payroll taxes to finance Medicare for All could have negative economic effects by shrinking the
economy (CRFB 2019). While instituting Medicare’s fee for service payment rates on hospitals
and clinics could provide savings of up to $100 billion per year, it could present net costs
(Galvani et al. 2020). If rates are too low, providers may choose not to participate in Medicare
for All and instead enter into private contracts, retire sooner, or change career paths (Liu and
Eibner 2019). Low payment rates would either make the system more efficient or capacity might
not increase to meet demand, resulting in longer wait times and failing to deliver increased
access to care (Blumberg et al. 2019; Liu and Eibner 2019).
Medicare for All has a high degree of equality and fairness as it expands coverage to
include all Americans. It also removes potentially high out-of-pocket costs for everyone. This is
especially important for the uninsured population. Since Medicare for All would insure all
Americans and removes out-of-pocket costs that prevent many from seeking necessary care, it
achieves a high degree of equality as individuals would be able to receive care regardless of their
socioeconomic status. The cost of health insurance remains a primary issue for many families
and individuals, but Medicare for All would make sure they are able to receive care. The bill also
contains provisions specifically aimed at low income individuals. Since Medicare for All would
replace Medicaid, there were some concerns related to how Medicaid recipients would be
affected. However, Medicare for All will positively impact Medicaid beneficiaries as well as
other low-income individuals because it makes eligibility requirements the same across the
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nation, rather than the current system of unequal eligibility requirements. It would also eliminate
the variability in benefits packages as all Medicaid recipients would receive the same benefits
across the nation and continue to cover essential benefits such as the Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (ESDT) benefit which provides care to low-income
children (Tolbert, Rudowitz, and Musumeci 2019). Medicare for All also helps achieve equality
as it has the potential to reduce racial disparities in insurance coverage as all Americans would
be covered. By removing the financial barriers to health insurance, Medicare for All achieves a
high degree of equality as it provides insurance to all socioeconomic levels and racial groups.
Medicare for All can also achieve equality as it has the potential to save 68,531 lives per year
because it expands access to insurance, with individuals between the ages of 25 and 35 more
likely to benefit (Galavni et al. 2020). Freedom under Medicare for All may be limited
depending on the degree to which patients can choose their medical provider, which would
depend not only on the structure of the program but also provider payment rates and wait times.
Freedom could also be potentially limited as it does not let individuals opt out of the insurance
system as some could arguing that mandating and automatically enrolling all Americans violates
the concept of freedom. Medicare for All, however, does allow for some choice as individuals
can buy supplemental private insurance to cover benefits not under Medicare for All.
After there is extensive debate in the policy community, the policy community may or
may not reach consensus and a tipping point. In order to understand whether the policy
community has reached a consensus, testimony from two hearings held by the House of
Representatives will be analyzed. Officials who testified at both hearings provide a strong
sample of the health policy community as the individuals have decades of experience in research,
advocacy, and delivery of healthcare.
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Testimony in front of the House Rules Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee revealed the policy community is divided between Medicare for All and more
incremental approaches. Out of the ten policy specialists or advocates who testified in front of
either committee and recommended a specific course of action, five expressed direct support for
Medicare for All or other forms of single-payer, four acknowledged the benefits of more
incremental approaches, and another argued for less government intervention in healthcare. Dean
Baker, a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, testified that the
U.S. needs universal healthcare, but first needs to fix Medicare itself and could pursue more
transitional approaches before fully expanding the program for all Americans (Statement from
Dean Baker, Original Jurisdiction Hearing on H.R. 1384, Medicare for All Act 2019). Sara
Collins, Vice President of Health Care Coverage and Access for the Commonwealth Fund,
likewise testified that Medicare for All could help many Americans, but there are other proposals
that can expand access to affordable healthcare that “can be implemented without a major
reorganization of the healthcare system” (Statement from Sara Collins, Original Jurisdiction
Hearing on H.R. 1384, Medicare for All Act 101, 2019). Pam MacEwan, the Chief Executive
Officer of Washington’s Health Benefit Exchange, and Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, Managing
Director at Manatt Health Strategies LLC, also expressed support for policies that would build
off of the ACA, such as a public option or Medicare buy-in (Pathways to Universal Health
Coverage 2019). Policy specialists who testified in support of Medicare for All were steadfast in
their belief that healthcare is a human right and the U.S. must establish universal health
coverage. Due to this divide, the policy community has not reached consensus and,
consequently, has not reached a tipping-point in terms of building support. Medicare for All,
however, could slowly garner more support among the policy community if it has a longer
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“softening up” stage, but until that takes place, it appears unlikely to receive a major backing
from the policy community.

The Politics Stream
As previously discussed, there are three main components in the politics stream—the
national mood, organized political forces, and changes in government. While the national mood
has not entirely moved towards supporting Medicare for All, its leftward shift has given
politicians the illusion of broad support for single-payer healthcare. The national mood swinging
leftwards is natural considering the length it swung towards the right. Even though the ACA is
not a conservative policy, it did reflect a rightward shift in the national mood as it built upon,
protected, and utilized private insurance to extend coverage (Oberlander 2019). Even the public
option, which has now emerged as a popular proposal to expand healthcare coverage, had to be
dropped in order to secure passage of the ACA. It was unimaginable for single-payer healthcare
to be a central component of the Democratic nominee for president a decade ago and the issue
could not even receive a hearing during the debate on healthcare reform that led to the ACA
(Oberlander 2019; Wilensky 2019). There are two main reasons why the national mood has
moved leftward—the 2016 election and attempted repeal of the ACA (Oberlander 2019). The
two events worked together to cause a leftward shift nationally, particularly among Democrats.
Proposals to institute a single-payer system have existed for decades, as previously discussed,
but Sen. Sanders “put momentum behind it in his 2016 presidential campaign, and is doing so
again” (Levitt 16, 2019). The strong performance by Sanders and the challenge he presented to
Secretary Clinton during the 2016 primary helped move Medicare for All towards the
Democratic mainstream as his success showed a leftward turn in the party (Young 2019).
Republican attempts to repeal and replace the ACA prompted backlash from many constituents.
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GOP town halls in February 2017 saw crowds yell “Shame!” and “Resist!” and one constituent
told a GOP lawmaker that repealing the ACA was akin to “taking away my freedom and justice”
(Colliver 2017). Multiple publications describe the town halls that were held by Republican
lawmakers from February to August 2017 as raucous, angry, and hostile towards their effort to
repeal and replace (Cheney and Bade 2017; Colliver 2017; Fortin and Victor 2017; Weigel
2017). Soon after the GOP’s failure to repeal and replace the ACA, Sanders introduced the
Medicare for All Act of 2017, with several influential Democratic senators standing behind him
in support. This moment, which featured support from hundreds of healthcare activists,
grassroots members, and political allies, helped solidify that the Democratic base believed “that
Obamacare hadn’t gone nearly far enough, and the only way to secure its gains was with
something more radical” (Cancryn 2019).
The national mood consists of many different components, with public opinion amongst
them, and a majority of Americans have supported Medicare for All since June 2017 (Lopes,
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Figure 8 Over the past two years, a majority of Americans have supported Medicare for All (The Kaiser Family Foundation
2020).
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Democratic candidates for the 2020 election have established single-payer healthcare as
the “benchmark” for healthcare reform, however, support fluctuates depending on how the plan
is described (Young 2019).
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Figure 9 Support for Medicare for All decreases depending on how it is framed (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2020).

While the surveys from the Kaiser Family Foundation report a majority of Americans
support Medicare for All, a majority of respondents also believe that people would be able to
keep their current insurance (Lopes, Hamel, Kearney, and Brodie 2020). These findings
undermine support for Medicare for All as most Americans are unaware of the actual effects of
the bill. A majority of Democrat voters, meanwhile, would rather vote for a candidate who
supports building on the ACA rather than replacing it with Medicare for All (The Kaiser Family
Foundation 2020). Concerns have already been raised by constituents as freshmen Rep. Elissa
Slotkin, who represents a Michigan swing district, stated that people have already become
nervous about the prospect of government-run insurance (Armour and Jamerson 2019). The
national mood serves as just one obstacle towards Medicare for All in the politics stream.
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As the national mood towards Medicare for All continues to evolve, organized political
forces have begun to take action. In response to Medicare for All, the Partnership for America’s
Health Care Future was formed to oppose passage of single-payer healthcare. The Partnership
consists of groups from nearly every facet of the health industry. The Partnership received over
$5 million in just the first six months of its existence, with the coalition serving as “the most
formidable source of focus resistance to 2020 Democrats’ health plans outside of the Trump
reelection campaign” (Cancryn 2019). Even though the Partnership had not begun lobbying
lawmakers in the first quarter of 2019, its member organizations did not wait. From the first
quarter of 2018 to the first quarter of 2019, the number of lobbyists working on Medicare for All
increased from 29 to 270 as nine of the ten organizations with the most lobbyists oppose
Medicare for All (Sandler 2019).
Democratic political elites remain divided over Medicare for All. Rep. Jayapal’s bill has
received 118 cosponsors, while Sen. Sanders’ 2019 version has 14 cosponsors. Two caucuses
have formed within the House of Representatives that have endorsed single-payer healthcare.
Over 60 House Democrats belong to the Medicare for All Caucus, which was launched in the
summer of 2018 (Weixel 2018). Single-payer healthcare has support from a significant number
of either current or former 2020 Democratic presidential candidates as four senators cosponsored
Sanders’ bill, three cosponsored Jayapal’s bill, and Mayor Bill de Blasio also said he supports
single-payer (Young 2019). However, it is unlikely Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) will allow a
vote on Rep. Jayapal’s bill to occur in order to protect moderate freshman representatives.
Speaker Pelosi opposes Medicare for All as she supports more incremental approaches that can
build off of the ACA (Wilensky 2019). Pelosi and moderate members want to work to stabilize
and improve the ACA, lower out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs, allow individuals in
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their 50s to buy into Medicare, and ban short-term insurance plans that do not offer
comprehensive benefits. Political elites, who previously considered the idea of a public option as
too liberal, now welcome the idea as a moderate and incremental approach to expand coverage
(Stolberg and Pear 2019). Opposition to Medicare for All among organized political forces will
make it extremely difficult for the bill to gain passage.
The last significant component of the politics stream is change in government. With the
2018 midterm elections, Democrats regained control of the House, ending any attempts to repeal
and replace the ACA. As previously discussed, Democratic representatives in the House have
moved in opposite directions as some have pushed for Medicare for All, while others have
pushed for more incremental measures. Progressive Democrats may feel emboldened to pursue
Medicare for All because of their success in the midterm elections as well as the leftward
movement of their party. However, Medicare for All was not a successful policy platform for
Democratic House candidates in the midterm elections. In the midterm elections, only a slight
majority of Democratic House candidates, 51%, supported Medicare for All. Only in districts
that were labeled as Safe Democratic, meaning Clinton won by at least 20 points in the 2016
election, did a majority of candidates support Medicare for All. Support for Medicare for All was
lowest in districts that Trump won by less than 5% as only 15% of candidates supported singlepayer healthcare, signifying that “Democratic candidates were least likely to support Medicare
for All in marginally Republican districts where it could reduce their chances of winning”
(Abramowitz 2019). An analysis of 2018 election results in competitive House districts where
there was either no Republican incumbent or Trump won the district by less than 10 points
showed that Democrats who didn’t support Medicare for All won more races than those who did
support it (72% versus 45%). This is significant as at least thirty-one of the forty seats Democrats
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won were in these competitive House districts (Abramowitz 2019). While the midterm elections
were a victory for Democrats, it was a noticeable defeat for single-payer proponents and this will
make it increasingly difficult to increase support for Medicare for All if politicians in
competitive races will lose if they support it.
It is difficult to predict how the 2020 presidential election will affect Medicare for All’s
passage, but it will be difficult to enact Medicare for All no matter the outcome of the election.
Sen. Warren (D-MA), a former leading contender for the Democratic nomination, was forced to
alter her proposed timeline of healthcare reform following significant backlash. Under her
current plan, she would work to expand public healthcare coverage to all children, Americans
who make up to 200% of the FPL, and allow people to buy into it. She would then pursue
Medicare for All in her third year of office. In response to this, Sen. Sanders announced he will
introduce Medicare for All legislation in the first week he’s in office (Goodnough, Kaplan, and
Sanger-Katz 2019). Even if Democrats retake control of the White House from Trump, Medicare
for All is still far away from passage. If candidates supportive of Medicare for All were more
likely to lose in the midterm elections, they may face significant obstacles if the Democratic
nominee intends to pursue single-payer healthcare. Democrats do not control the Senate and
many 2020 Senate Democratic candidates running to unseat Republican incumbents in Arizona,
Colorado, Iowa, and North Carolina and trying to defend their seats in Alabama, New
Hampshire, and Michigan are campaigning on incremental measures rather than Medicare for
All (Ollstein and Arkin 2019).
Currently, Medicare for All has failed to gain significant support from the national mood,
organized political forces, or changes in government. Further, there is no consensus over
Medicare for All in the policy community. The policy window only opens when all three streams
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converge. As of now, it is extremely unlikely for the policy window to open as the politics and
policy stream are not fully supportive of single-payer healthcare.

Policy Alternatives
Other policy options, such as a public option, are being considered and debated by the
policy community. While analyzing Medicare for All, Blumberg et al. (2019) also analyzed
several other policy options. The options they analyzed represent some of the proposals that are
being debated within the policy community.
The first two options Blumberg et al. (2019) analyzed are described as incremental as
both make only small changes to the ACA. Their first reform option would reduce cost-sharing
requirements and premiums for individuals up to 400% of the FPL. This option would expand
coverage to nearly 4 million Americans and decrease the uninsured rate by 12.5%. Under this
reform option, federal spending would increase by $25.7 billion per year, but federal costs for
uncompensated care would decrease by $4.8 billion. State and average household spending
would also slightly decrease due to less uncompensated care and an increase in insured
nonelderly individuals. The second reform option is the same as the first one but would also
restore the individual mandate and prohibit short-term limited-duration plans. Even though this
option would provide insurance to 6.3 million people, the number of uninsured would equal the
first reform option because this one would prohibit short-term limited-duration plans. The federal
government would pay slightly less under this plan, $24.5 billion, but state governments,
employers, and individuals would all spend roughly the same compared to the first reform option
(Blumberg et al. 2019).
The next several reform options analyzed by Blumberg et al. (2019) would go further
than the first two options. A third option would give individuals who live in states that have not
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expanded Medicaid premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions if their income is below the
FPL. It would also automatically enroll SNAP and TANF participants into either their state’s
Medicaid program if it was expanded or into a private insurance program with premium subsidy
levels at or below non-expansion state’s. The federal government would also pay all the costs
associated with Medicaid expansion in states that have expanded their program. This option
would provide insurance to an additional 10.8 million Americans but would increase federal
spending by $81.3 billion per year. Employers, states, and households would have significant
savings under this program; however, total national spending would increase by $40 billion. The
next reform builds on these provisions by including a public option and would cap provider
payment rates in addition to having all of the same components as the third reform option. This
option would expand coverage to 11 million additional Americans and increase federal spending
by $46.7 billion. The last reform they analyzed creates a public option with Continuous
Autoenrollment with Retroactive Enforcement (CARE) which all individuals would be enrolled
into if they do not otherwise have insurance, most clearly resembles the Medicare for America
Act of 2019. This option would also eliminate the penalties for employers who do not provide
health insurance. Through the automatic enrollment into the public option, the uninsured rate
would decrease by 80% as 25.6 million Americans would gain insurance. However, 6.6 million
would remain uninsured because they are not legal residents. Federal healthcare costs would
increase by $122 billion, but employers would save roughly $90 billion in healthcare costs
(Blumberg et al. 2019). Since the policy community has yet to reach a consensus on Medicare
for All, they are still considering a variety of other policies that may have greater political and
technical feasibility in addition to social acceptability.
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Conclusion
Efforts to reform U.S. healthcare to address the issues of cost, access, and quality through
universal healthcare have spanned decades. As discussed earlier, the existing literature has
espoused several theories explaining its failure over the decades. The institutional theory argues
it is institutional factors, such as Senate procedural rules, that prevent universal healthcare from
gaining enough support. While the incremental theory appears similar, it is different from the
institutional theory because it states that policies must build off of each other and gestate long
enough for the public, media, and policy actors to fully debate the proposal. Lastly, flaws in
presidential strategy, such as President Clinton drafting his universal healthcare proposal rather
than Congress, have also been seen as the primary cause for failed attempts at establishing
universal healthcare.
After applying Kingdon’s multiple streams theory to Clinton’s health plan and the
Affordable Care Act, I argue that the incremental and presidential strategy theory are the most
applicable for understanding why universal healthcare proposals like Clinton’s have failed but a
major expansion of the government’s role in healthcare through the ACA succeeded. The
incremental theory is best examined through the policy stream where it is being debated and
modified by the policy community. The incremental theory explains the enactment of the ACA
because it directly built on the existing public-private hybrid system and utilized policies that
were discussed before the ACA was considered, such as the individual mandate or previous
proposals to expand Medicaid. Components of the ACA were even modeled off of
Massachusetts’s healthcare reform law of 2006. This is in stark contrast to the Health Security
Act, which would already face several obstacles since it would represent a major shift in how
Americans would receive health insurance. Not only was the Health Security Act proposing a
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fundamental change in the insurance industry, but did not include provisions from previous
proposals, with Kingdon writing that the bill appeared “unfamiliar and untested” (Kingdon 2011,
236). Since the ACA utilized an incremental approach by building off of, rather than replacing,
the current system and included provisions that were previously discussed, it highlights the
benefits of gestation. By allowing the policy community and those outside to fully debate and
consider the proposals over time, it allows for a stronger degree of consensus to be established.
The presidential strategy theory is most clearly seen in the political stream. By allowing
Congress to draft the legislation rather than forming a presidential task force to do so, the ACA
had a greater likelihood of passage because congressional leaders could design it to maximize
their votes. President Obama also integrated and included interest groups in forming the bill
better than the Clinton administration. These two significant differences in presidential strategy
bolstered the chances for the ACA to be enacted.
Unlike the other two theories, the institutional theory only partially explains the
enactment of the ACA and the failure of the Health Security Act. President Obama and senior
congressional Democrats leveraged the institutions to help secure passage, such as only needing
a majority in the Senate rather than sixty votes to pass the ACA. However, the institutional
theory is not entirely applicable to the failure of the Health Security Act. The institutional theory
can potentially be seen as a factor depending on the outcome of the 2020 presidential and
congressional elections as a candidate who supports Medicare for All could win the presidency
but fail to have a majority in Congress. Thus, while the institutional theory should not be
completely dismissed, future scholarship and evaluation of healthcare reform proposals should
primarily enlist the incremental and presidential strategy theories to explain whether it can be
passed.
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Applying these two theories to the Medicare for All Act is a useful strategy to further
evaluate its odds of passage. While Medicare for All is tied to an existing program, it is a
fundamental shift in the purpose of Medicare as instead of covering seniors, it would cover
everyone. Further, it would entirely replace the public-private hybrid system and create an
entirely new system. According to the incremental theory, it would be extremely difficult to gain
sufficient support. While it is too early to assess how the presidential strategy theory would
impede or aid the Medicare for All Act, it already faces significant barriers. These barriers
include the aforementioned organized political forces and many congressional Democrats.
Supporters of Medicare for All, however, may emphasize the support the proposal has among the
general public and how elected officials should focus on this rather than opposition from political
forces. Advocates should primarily focus on the policy stream to increase support for Medicare
for All because if the policy community could reach a consensus, some moderate Democratic
lawmakers could be swayed. The policy stream can also change and alter Medicare for All in
order to resolve some of its issues, such as the high cost.
Due to these issues, other policies can be considered. The policy that comes closest to
establishing universal healthcare, while not placing all Americans on Medicare, is the
Continuous Autoenrollment with Retroactive Enforcement (CARE) proposal. The CARE
proposal has already gained some traction among the policy community outside the Urban
Institute, which conducted the original analysis, as policy entrepreneurs from the Brookings
Institute have expressed support for some version of it (Young 2019). This option would serve as
a more incremental approach and a potential compromise between the differing factions in the
Democratic party.
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There are several limitations to the arguments and conclusions that appear throughout this
paper. First, this paper is constrained due to time limitations. This is especially evident during the
application of the multiple streams approach to the Health Security Act, ACA, and Medicare for
All as time limits the amount of research I can conduct because I am unable to discuss every
single aspect of the problem, policy, and politics stream for all three bills. Further, I primarily
utilized secondary sources that describe and analyze the events surrounding each of the three
bills and did not use primary sources. The individual analyses of Medicare for All have their own
limitations as well. Each analysis of Medicare for All includes different assumptions as to how
the law will be implemented, specifically for provider payment rates, and possible effects, such
as supply constraints. The different assumptions each researcher included in their design explains
the range of cost estimates. This serves as a limitation on the overall Medicare for All analysis I
have conducted as it is impossible to know all of the specifics of Medicare for All that have not
been included in the bill as well as the externalities.
Future research should further examine the previously discussed theories in explaining
the failure or success of healthcare reform. Scholars should continue to analyze Medicare for All,
despite not knowing all of the details. If scholars examine the costs and impacts of different
versions of Medicare for All that have different components, such as the generosity of benefits,
provider payment levels, or cost-sharing requirements, policy entrepreneurs would be able to
make a more informed decision. Researchers and policy entrepreneurs should also analyze other
forms of universal health insurance beside Medicare for All. While Medicare for All has
emerged as the dominant policy proposal, there are other forms of universal coverage, such as
the national health service (NHS) and socialized health insurance (SHI). Research must be
conducted to see if either form could provide higher quality care at a lower cost.
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This study aimed to explore the current systemic problems in the U.S. healthcare system
and possible reform options to achieve universal coverage and the barriers they could face by
examining past reform efforts. By conducting this analysis, it contributes an understanding of the
factors involved in past healthcare reform attempts and provides a framework suggesting that the
best path forward is to attempt more incremental measures to contain costs and extend coverage.
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